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Introduction
Like settlement,1 arbitration has been criticized as displacing cases
from the public courts and thereby reducing the production of court
†

John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law.
Thanks to the faculties of the Missouri and Iowa law schools; participants
in the annual conference of the Midwestern Law & Economics Association
at Emory, Alabama, and Villanova law schools; and George Bermann,
Myriam Gilles, David Horton, Tom Ginsburg, Adam Levitin, Erin O’Hara
O’Connor, Catherine Rogers, Bo Rutledge, Amy Schmitz, Stacie Strong,
Steve Ware, and Mark Weidemaier for their helpful comments on previous
iterations of this Article. Thanks also to Florencia Marotta-Wurgler for
sharing data from her work as a Reporter for the Restatement of the Law:
Consumer Contracts. I also appreciate help from Julia Drahozal, Sarmad
Majeed, and Alex Reed on software coding and data collection.
I served as a consultant to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) on its arbitration study discussed in this Article. The views stated
here are my own and not those of the CFPB or the United States.

1.

See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984)
(“A settlement will . . . deprive a court of the occasion, and perhaps even
the ability, to render [an authoritative] interpretation [of law].”); see also
Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. Phil. &
Pol’y 102, 104, 114–15 (1986) (asserting that settlements might result in
the “[u]nderproduction of public goods”—“[o]pinions and precedents . . .
[that] are sources of information about the things that can and cannot
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precedent. For example, Richard Alderman has contended that
“[a]rbitration eliminates litigation in a public forum, precedentestablishing decisions, and stare decisis.”2 Myriam Gilles has argued
that “[f]or the entire categories of cases that are ushered into this
[arbitration] vault—from consumer law, to employment law, to much
of antitrust law—common law doctrinal development will cease.”3
Charles Knapp has stated more broadly—and more colorfully—that
“[i]f all contract disputes which the parties could not settle between
themselves had to be submitted to arbitration for resolution, rather
than to a court of law, the common law of contract . . . would become
merely an historical relic, a legal King Tut in its elaborately detailed
Restatement (Second) sarcophagus.”4 I call this the “displacement
hypothesis.”5
Concerns about the displacement of court precedent by arbitration
are not limited to academics. Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, for example, has asserted:
“We have a common law system that is enriched by progression and
development of law through cases later resolved on appeal. Such
development only happens if cases are tried in public in courts of law
[rather than in arbitration]. . . . Without cases, our common law will
stagnate . . . .”6 Nor are the concerns limited to the United States. Lord
Neuberger, the now-retired President of the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom, has stated: “One of the disadvantages of an increase
lawfully be done in a society”); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion
of the Public Realm, 82 Geo. L.J. 2619, 2623 (1995) (“[A]djudication
may often prove superior to settlement for securing the peace because the
former, unlike the latter, creates rules and precedents.”).
2.

Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the
Common Law, 2 J. Am. Arb. 1, 11 (2003); see also The Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on the
Const. of S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Richard M. Alderman, Director, Center for Consumer Law, University of
Houston Law Center), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Alderman%20Testimony%20121207.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK9A-5R5J]
(arguing that arbitration will “essentially freez[e] the common law of
consumer transactions, denying courts the ability to develop and adapt
the law”).

3.

Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End
of Law, 2016 U. Ill. L. Rev. 371, 377.

4.

Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in
Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761, 786 (2002).

5.

Cf. Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. 7, 24–
25 (considering whether the “vanishing trial” is due to “displacement” of
trials from public courts to other “trial-like events,” including “arbitration
proceedings”).

6.

Jennifer Walker Elrod, Is the Jury Still Out?: A Case for the Continued
Viability of the American Jury, 44 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 303, 324 (2012)
(footnote omitted).
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in [arbitration] awards and a concomitant decrease in judgments,
particularly in the common law world, is that the law does not develop,
that it becomes ossified.”7
Arbitration differs from settlement in that the result of the
arbitration proceeding—an arbitral award—might itself produce legal
rules and substitute for court precedent. But the standard view is that
arbitrators have little incentive to issue awards that produce legal rules.
In their classic article, Adjudication as a Private Good, William Landes
and Richard A. Posner argue:
[B]ecause of the difficulty of establishing property rights in a
precedent, private judges have little incentive to produce
precedents. They will strive for a fair result between the parties
in order to preserve a reputation for impartiality, but why should
they make any effort to explain the result in a way that would
provide guidance for future parties? To do so would be to confer
an external, an uncompensated, benefit not only on future parties
but also on competing judges.8

In other words, rule production (as opposed to dispute resolution)
results in positive externalities—benefits conferred on nonparties to the
dispute. Because the parties to the dispute do not receive the full benefit
of a rule-producing award, they will not pay the arbitrator enough to
issue such awards. As a result, the argument goes, a system of
7.

David Neuberger, President, Sup. Ct. of the U.K., Keynote Speech at the
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Centenary Celebration, Hong Kong:
Arbitration and the Rule of Law para. 24 (Mar. 20, 2015), www.supremecourt.
uk/docs/speech-150320.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XCV-9292]; see also John
Thomas, Lord C.J. of Eng. and Wales, Fourth BAILII Lecture: Developing
Commercial Law Through the Courts; Rebalancing the Relationship
Between the Courts and Arbitration para. 5 (Mar. 9, 2016) [hereinafter
BAILII Lecture 2016], https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2016/03/lcj-speech-bailli-lecture-20160309.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8HM2GU4] (“As arbitration clauses are widespread in some sectors of economic
activity, there has been a serious impediment to the development of the
common law by courts in the UK . . . .”); Giuditta Cordero-Moss & Daniel
Behn, Arbitration and the Development of Law, in Cambridge Compendium
of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration (Andrea
K. Bjorklund, Franco Ferrari, & Stefan Kröll eds.) (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript § 4.2 n.119, at 28) (on file with authors) (“The then Chief
Justice of the Norwegian Supreme Court, Carsten Smith, expressed similar
concern already in the early 1990s, see C. Smith, ‘Voldgift – Domstolenes
Konkurrent og Hjelper’, Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 5 (1993), 474.”).

8.

William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good,
8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 238 (1979); see also IDS Life Ins. Co. v.
SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, C.J.)
(“[Arbitrators’] decisions, which in the case of commercial as distinct from
labor arbitration are rarely even accompanied by an opinion, are more
like jury verdicts than like the decisions of courts, and jury verdicts are
not given any weight as precedents.”).
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arbitration will produce too little precedent.9 Other commentators, such
as Professors Gilles10 and Alderman,11 have echoed this analysis.12 I call
this the “positive externalities hypothesis.”
This Article critically examines both the displacement hypothesis
and the positive externalities hypothesis; it analyzes both the likelihood
that arbitration will displace court precedent and the incentive of
arbitrators to produce awards that can substitute for court precedent.13
In so doing, the Article offers new theoretical and empirical insights
that provide the groundwork for a comprehensive account of arbitration
and rule production. Its central insights are the following:
First, the Article considers the underlying factual predicate for the
displacement hypothesis: the extent to which arbitration is used to
resolve disputes in the relevant contracting market. I define the
“relevant contracting market” as the type or types of contracts likely
to give rise to disputes raising legal issues in a particular field of law
9.

Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 248 (“[A]rbitration awards are not a
source of rules or precedents. This is understandable in the case of general
commercial arbitration because of the public-good character of precedent.”).

10.

Gilles, supra note 3, at 410 (“[A]rbitrators are simply not expected or paid
to write precedential decisions—and if they were, the expense of
arbitration would grow exponentially.”).

11.

Alderman, supra note 2, at 12 n.52 (“Because their decisions are final and
limited to the purpose of resolving the immediate dispute, arbitrators have
little motivation to explain their awards in a way that makes them useful
to future litigants or the general public.”).

12.

See also, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The
Hollowed Out Common Law, 67 UCLA L. Rev. 600, 635 (2020) (“When
dispute resolution is privatized so that no published legal rulings ensue,
this process of creating law as a public good is potentially arrested.”);
David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 985, 1007 (2017)
(noting that, “[i]nsofar as arbitration is ‘private and confidential,’ it generates none of these public goods,” such as “contribut[ing] to a working
system of precedent” (footnotes omitted)) (quoting Thomas J. Stipanowich,
In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or Closed Door Litigation?: The
Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 349,
372 (2013)); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing
Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab.
& Emp. L. 685, 705 (2004) (“Movement of cases from the courts to the
arbitration forum, which lacks written opinions, precludes creation of the
body of precedent necessary to develop and articulate any generally
accepted interpretation of the statute.”).

13.

My focus here is on the relationship between arbitration and rule
production in a common-law system. How the use of arbitration clauses
affects compliance with legal obligations is a separate issue and one I do
not address. For one perspective on that issue, see J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of the Substantive Law, 124 Yale
L.J. 3052, 3091 (2015) (“The Supreme Court’s recent arbitration
revolution, and its decision in Italian Colors in particular, is troubling
insofar as it permits and creates an incentive for entities to self-deregulate
through private contract.”).
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and in a particular jurisdiction. Determining the relevant contracting
market is analogous to determining the relevant market for antitrust
merger analysis: it requires consideration of both the relevant product
market (the field of law at issue) and the relevant geographic market
(the jurisdiction in which the law is applicable).14 This analysis has two
implications for understanding arbitration and rule production: (1) the
relevant field of law typically is not “contract law” or the “common
law,” but instead “employment law” or “franchise law” or even
narrower fields of law; and (2) jurisdictions with less use of arbitration
might produce court decisions that can serve as (at least persuasive)
precedent for jurisdictions with more use of arbitration.
Second, once the relevant contracting market is defined, the next
question is what proportion of disputes in that contracting market are
resolved in court and what proportion are resolved in arbitration. Some
commentators have argued that sufficient cases will continue to be
resolved in court so that fears about the displacement hypothesis are
unwarranted.15 According to Rick Bales, for example, “there will always
be some employees . . . with the bargaining power to refuse [arbitration]
agreements, and there will be some jobs . . . for which employers will
prefer the barriers to access of litigation over arbitration. Thus, there
will still be plenty of employment cases and judicial opinions.”16 Other
14.

See U.S. Dep’t of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines § 4, at 8 (2010) (explaining that “a relevant
market . . . has both a product and a geographic dimension”),
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XBC2-DZMS].

15.

Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court so concluded in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. when it rejected the argument that
arbitration will “stifl[e] . . . the development of the law” as a basis for
finding claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
nonarbitrable. 500 U.S. 20, 31–32 (1991) (reasoning that “judicial
decisions addressing ADEA claims will continue to be issued because it is
unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants will be subject to
arbitration agreements”).

16.

Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration
at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 331, 366 (2006); see also
James P. Nehf, The Impact of Mandatory Arbitration on the Common
Law Regulation of Standard Terms in Consumer Contracts, 85 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1692, 1711 (2017) (“There will likely always be some
consumer contracts that do not include arbitration clauses, even if the
number dwindles over time. Some decisions will inevitably result from
disputes involving those contracts, and the common law will move
forward.” (footnote omitted)); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration
Stymies Progress Towards Justice in Employment Law: Where To,
#MeToo?, 54 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 155, 182 (2019) (“[E]ven if
many employees are required to arbitrate their claims, presumably at least
some precedent will continue to exist, because not all employers mandate
arbitration of all claims by all employees.”); Mark R. Lee, Antitrust and
Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Analysis, 62 St. John’s L. Rev.
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commentators, however, have predicted that all businesses are likely to
switch to arbitration clauses in their standard form contracts with
employees and consumers. As Professor Brian Fitzpatrick has stated:
“[Arbitration clauses with class-action] waivers are tantamount to
insulating businesses altogether from liability for the small-stakes
injuries they cause. Why wouldn’t every business want such insulation?
I think every business would.”17 In response to Professor Fitzpatrick’s
question, this Article offers several possible reasons businesses might
not use arbitration clauses and presents anecdotal and empirical
evidence consistent with those reasons. Moreover, widespread use of
arbitration clauses alone is not enough to make a contracting market
“arbitration-only”—i.e., one in which all disputes are resolved in
arbitration. In addition, the arbitration clauses must not carve out
relevant disputes from arbitration, parties must not opt out of the
obligation to arbitrate, and parties must invoke arbitration clauses in
the relevant disputes.
Third, the Article examines the effect of arbitration on rule
production by courts in a partial-arbitration market—that is, a
contracting market with some, but not all, disputes resolved in
arbitration. Some commentators, accepting a simple version of the
displacement hypothesis, assume an inverse, perhaps even linear,
relationship between the use of arbitration and production of court

1, 18 (1987) (“[T]he fewer published opinions prediction is unlikely to
come true . . . . [C]ompelling arbitration [of antitrust claims] . . . would
probably not cause an appreciable decline in the rate at which antitrust
opinions would be published.”); John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements
and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of
Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 219, 241 (1986) (“It seems
totally implausible, however, that the number would be so reduced that
private antitrust suits would cease to provide an important vehicle for the
development and refinement of antitrust precedent.”).
17.

Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 161,
190 (2015); see also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 Mich.
L. Rev. 373, 377 (2005) (“I regard it as inevitable that firms will
ultimately act in their economic best interests, and those interests dictate
that virtually all companies will opt out of exposure to class action
liability. Why wouldn’t they?”); Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Nukes
Consumers’ Rights in Most Pro-Corporate Decision Since Citizens
United, ThinkProgress (Apr. 27, 2011, 7:40 PM), archive.thinkprogress.org/
supreme-court-nukes-consumers-rights-in-most-pro-corporate-decision-sincecitizens-united-c0a08ace6995/ [https://perma.cc/N9CK-MM4D] (“After
Concepcion, it is only a matter of time before nearly every credit card
provider, cell phone company, mail-order business or even every potential
employer requires anyone who wants to do business with them to first
give up their right to file a class action.”).

96

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Arbitration and Rule Production

precedent.18 On this view, more arbitration means less court precedent.
Others recognize that the relationship may not be so simple. Professor
Knapp, for example, acknowledges that “the widespread use of
arbitration by willing parties” has not been and is not “likely to be fatal
to the common law of contract.”19 “After all,” according to Knapp,
“disputants who choose to arbitrate might instead have simply chosen
to settle their disputes on their own, without resort to any external
decision-maker.”20 This Article extends the analysis in Marc Galanter’s
Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead to explain how businesses might use
arbitration clauses (instead of settlements) to avoid the creation of
unfavorable court precedent.21 One implication of this analysis is that,
as suggested by Knapp, increased use of arbitration might displace
settlements (of cases otherwise likely to create unfavorable law) rather
than reducing the production of court precedent.22
Finally, the Article reevaluates the positive externalities hypothesis
by considering rule production in an arbitration-only market. While the
positive externalities hypothesis is widely accepted, Mark Weidemaier
and others have demonstrated that arbitrators do, in fact, rely on rules
created by arbitral precedent in a variety of settings.23 This Article
builds on the work of these commentators by squaring this empirical
reality with the theory underlying the positive externalities

18.

E.g., Neuberger, supra note 7, para. 24; see, e.g., Lee, supra note 16, at
15–16 (“The ‘fewer published opinions’ prediction rests on the following
chain of logic: compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims would slow
the rate at which such claims would be resolved—wholly or partially—
through standard litigation; that slowdown would in turn slow the rate at
which antitrust opinions would be published and hence precedent
produced . . . .”).

19.

Knapp, supra note 4, at 785.

20.

Id. at 785, 789 (distinguishing between willing parties and parties to
adhesion contracts).

21.

Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 101–02 (1974).

22.

See Knapp, supra note 4, at 786.

23.

See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create
Precedent, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 1091, 1100 (2012) [hereinafter Weidemaier,
Judging-Lite] (presenting a “more nuanced picture” of precedent in
arbitration); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in
Arbitration, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1895, 1905 (2010) [hereinafter
Weidemaier, Precedent in Arbitration] (“[P]arties often do pay arbitrators
to produce reasoned awards, and these awards are often made available
to the public.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Christopher R.
Drahozal, Empirical Findings on International Arbitration: An
Overview, in The Oxford Handbook on International Arbitration
§ 27.7 (Thomas Schultz & Federico Ortino eds., 2020) (survey of literature
on citation of arbitral awards by international arbitrators).
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hypothesis.24 The positive externalities hypothesis incorrectly focuses on
the incentives of arbitrators, rather than the incentives of the parties
to the dispute, and overlooks the role of arbitral institutions in the
arbitration process.25 On this expanded view, there is good reason to
believe that arbitrators will often issue reasoned awards and that at
least some portion of those awards will be made public.26 Indeed, current
practice in consumer, employment, and international arbitration belies
claims to the contrary.27
Part I of this Article addresses the need to define the relevant
contracting market, explains why the widespread use of arbitration
clauses is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a contracting
market to be arbitration-only, and presents empirical evidence on the
use of arbitration clauses in various contracting markets. Part II
examines the effect of arbitration on rule production by courts in
partial-arbitration markets. In particular, it provides a theoretical
explanation for why arbitration might displace settlements rather than
precedent-producing court cases. Part III considers rule production in
arbitration-only markets and offers a critique of the positive
externalities hypothesis. The Article concludes by identifying other
questions, both positive and normative, to be considered in evaluating
arbitration and rule production.

I. The Use of Arbitration in Relevant Contracting
Markets
The starting point for examining the effect of arbitration on rule
production is with its factual predicate: the extent to which arbitration
has displaced litigation for resolving particular types of disputes. This
Part critically examines three common assumptions about the
relationship between the use of arbitration and the production of court
precedent that are central to the displacement hypothesis.
First, commentators sometimes assert that arbitration will interfere
with the production of consumer law, contract law, or even the common
law as a whole. This Part argues that such a focus is too broad. Instead,
the appropriate benchmark is the type or types of contracts likely to
give rise to disputes that raise legal issues in a particular field and in a
24.

See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool:
Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. Mich.
J.L. Reform 843, 853 n.37 (2008) (“For many defendants, an adverse
court judgment not only will impose direct financial costs but also may
create a precedent with reputational or future legal consequences. Under
these conditions, some theories predict both relatively higher settlement
rates and relatively higher defendant win-rates.”).

25.

See infra notes 159–61, 168–71 and accompanying text.

26.

See infra notes 162–67, 172–75 and accompanying text.

27.

See infra notes 177–90 and accompanying text.
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particular jurisdiction. Second, commentators often assume that
widespread use of arbitration clauses in a relevant contracting market
is sufficient to prevent disputes from being resolved in court. But while
a necessary condition, widespread use of arbitration clauses is not a
sufficient condition for a market to be “arbitration-only.” In addition,
the arbitration clause must not carve out relevant disputes from
arbitration, the parties must not opt out of the obligation to arbitrate,
and the parties must invoke the arbitration clause in a sufficient
number of cases. Third, some commentators have predicted that,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,28 all businesses are likely to switch to arbitration clauses
in their standard form contracts with consumers and employees. This
Part concludes by examining reasons why some businesses might not
use arbitration clauses and presents empirical evidence testing the
prediction that all will.
A. Defining the Relevant Contracting Market

Commentators have asserted at times that arbitration will freeze
development of “consumer law,”29 “contract law,”30 or even the
“common law” as a whole.31 Such assertions are unduly imprecise and
likely claim too much. For arbitration to freeze the development of
contract law generally, it would have to be used widely to resolve all
types of contract disputes. For arbitration to freeze development of the
common law, the types of disputes consistently resolved in arbitration
would have to be even broader.32
Instead, evaluating the effect of arbitration on the production of
court precedent typically requires a more particularized analysis of
individual fields of law, not assertions about the effect of arbitration on
precedent generally. So viewed, the extent to which arbitration is likely
to displace court precedent depends on the “relevant contracting
market” for the field of law at issue. By “relevant contracting market,”
I mean the type or types of contracts likely to give rise to disputes that
raise legal issues in a particular field and in a particular jurisdiction.
The inquiry is conceptually similar to the definition of the relevant
market in antitrust-law merger analysis, which requires defining both

28.

563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).

29.

E.g., Gilles, supra note 3, at 377.

30.

E.g., Knapp, supra note 4, at 786.

31.

E.g., BAILII Lecture 2016, supra note 7, at para. 5.

32.

See Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?: The Case Against
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 267, 275
(2008) (arguing that the criticism of arbitration as resulting in the “diminution
of public law” “implicitly depends on another empirical assumption about
the prevalence of arbitration clauses”).
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the relevant product market and the relevant geographic market.33 The
analogue to defining the relevant product market is identifying the type
or types of contracts likely to give rise to the particular legal issues of
interest. The analogue to defining the relevant geographic market is
identifying the jurisdiction in which the legal issues are likely to arise
(e.g., either a particular country or countries, or state or states).
Defining the relevant contracting market first requires identifying
the field of law at issue. For example, the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA)
protects consumer credit card users from liability for the unauthorized
use of their credit card.34 Disputes raising issues about these statutory
provisions only arise out of the use of consumer credit cards.35
Accordingly, in determining whether arbitration might displace court
precedent concerning the TILA protections, the relevant contracting
market is consumer credit-card agreements.36 The use of arbitration
clauses in other types of contracts is not relevant.
By comparison, if the legal field at issue is the unauthorized-use
protections for consumers set out in the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
(EFTA),37 the relevant contracting market is the market for “electronic
fund transfers.”38 This contracting market includes payment
mechanisms such as debit cards, automated clearing-house transactions,
and prepaid accounts, but not credit cards.39 Because the EFTA does
not apply to credit cards,40 the extent to which arbitration clauses are
33.

E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 14, § 4,
at 8; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Vertical
Merger Guidelines § 3, at 3 (2020), www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/
1290686/download [https://perma.cc/3HMQ-FHV5]. See generally David
Glasner & Sean P. Sullivan, The Logic of Market Definition, 83 Antitrust
L.J. 293 (2020).

34.

15 U.S.C. § 1643(a), (d) (2019).

35.

Id. § 1602(l), (n).

36.

Richard Alderman seems to recognize this point, at least implicitly.
Alderman, supra note 2, at 16 (“As things currently stand, it is extremely
unlikely that any of the legal issues surrounding the use of credit cards
and credit card agreements will again see the inside of a courtroom.”).

37.

15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a), (e) (2019).

38.

Id. § 1693a(7).

39.

See 12 C.F.R. §§ 1005.3(b), 1005.18(a) (2021); Comment for 1005.3
Coverage, CFPB (last visited Nov. 26, 2021), https://www.consumerfinance.
gov/rules-policy/regulations/1005/interp-3/ [https://perma.cc/2T5A-VC58].

40.

See Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 560 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[EFTA] does not apply to credit-based transactions.”); Farrish v. Navy
Fed. Credit Union, No. DKC 16–1429, 2017 WL 4418416, *4 (D. Md. Oct.
5, 2017) (“‘Importantly, because [the] EFTA deals with electronic funds
transferred directly from bank accounts, it applies to debit cards, but not
credit cards.’” (alteration in original) (quoting White v. Chase Bank USA,
N.A., No. 5:16–cv–00176–BR, 2017 WL 1131898, *5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 24,
2017))), aff’d, 711 F. App’x 189 (4th Cir. 2018).
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used in credit-card agreements is irrelevant. The relevant contracting
market is contracts governing electronic fund transfers within the
meaning of the statute.
As to some legal issues, however, the field of law at issue could in
fact be contract law generally. If so, the relevant contracting market
would comprise all types of contracts and contract provisions—possibly
including arbitration clauses themselves. For example, a significant
number of unconscionability cases in recent years involved challenges
to provisions in arbitration clauses, at least some of which (like damages
waivers and class waivers) have non-arbitration counterparts.41 In those
cases, the use of arbitration clauses might have contributed (to some
extent at least) to the production of court precedent rather than
displacing it.42
Of course, the separability doctrine generally limits courts to
deciding challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement
itself (unless the parties agree otherwise), rather than challenges
directed at the enforceability of the main contract.43 So some contract
law issues in cases subject to arbitration typically will not be resolved

41.

Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us
About How State Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to
Arbitration Agreements, 97 Marq. L. Rev. 751, 776 (2014) (study of 20
state courts between 1980 and 2012 finding that 237 of 460 (51.52%) cases
with unconscionability challenges involved arbitration clauses); Charles
L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration:
Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609, 622
(2009) (study of reported case law on unconscionability from 1990 through
2008 finding: “The number of unconscionability cases involving issues
other than arbitration remained fairly constant over the period we
reviewed . . . . The annual number of arbitration clause cases, however,
expanded rather dramatically—from 1 or 2 at most through 1996, up to
an average of 38 from the years 2003 through 2007, and to 115 in 2008.”).

42.

In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted
California’s application of unconscionability doctrine to invalidate a class
waiver in an arbitration clause. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011). But courts generally have not applied
Concepcion to preclude unconscionability challenges to other provisions
in arbitration clauses. See Restatement of the U.S. L. of Int’l Com.
& Inv.-State Arb. § 1.6 reporter’s note (b)(ii) to cmt. b, at 115–16 (Am.
L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2019).

43.

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967)
(“[I]n passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate,
a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and
performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”); see Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (“[U]nless the challenge is
to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is
considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.”); see also Restatement
of the U.S. L. of Int’l Com. & Inv.-State Arb. § 2.7 cmts. a–b, at
189–91 (Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2019).
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in court.44 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center
West v. Jackson permits parties to delegate many challenges to the
enforceability of arbitration clauses, including unconscionability, to the
arbitrators to decide.45 Accordingly, since Rent-A-Center, courts are
less likely than they used to be to address unconscionability and other
challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements.46
But even under the separability doctrine, issues of contract
formation—whether directed at the main contract or at the arbitration
clause—remain for courts to decide.47 And that is so even when the
parties’ arbitration agreement includes a delegation clause.48
Accordingly, courts have issued numerous opinions on contractformation issues in cases involving challenges to the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.49
For example, roughly 40% of a sample of cases analyzing the
formation of clickwrap contracts, collected by the Reporters for the
Restatement of Consumer Contracts as the basis of an empirical study
for the Restatement, involved challenges to the enforceability of
arbitration clauses.50 A significant percentage of the browsewrap and
44.

Unless, of course, the parties waive the right to arbitrate. See infra text
accompanying notes 85–88.

45.

See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72 (2010);
Restatement of the U.S. L. of Int’l Com. & Inv.-State Arb. § 2.8
reporters’ note (b)(ii) to cmt. b, at 206 (Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final
Draft 2019).

46.

Nehf, supra note 16, at 1707.

47.

Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 295–
97 (2010) (stating that it is “well settled” that courts generally decide
disputes about the formation of arbitration agreements); see Restatement
of the U.S. L. of Int’l Com. & Inv.-State Arb. § 2.13(a), at 242
(Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2019).

48.

See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Alemayehu, 934 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir.
2019) (“[P]arties may not delegate to the arbitrator the fundamental
question of whether they formed the agreement to arbitrate in the first
place.”); Edwards v. Doordash, Inc., 888 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“Arguments that an agreement to arbitrate was never formed . . . are to
be heard by the court even where a delegation clause exists.”); see also
Restatement of the U.S. L. of Int’l Com. & Inv.-State Arb.
§ 2.13(b), at 242 (Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2019).

49.

Nehf, supra note 16, at 1711 (“Even if arbitration clauses are included in
the overwhelming majority of consumer contracts, some common law will
develop regarding the arbitration clause itself. Courts will still be called
upon to decide whether the consumer agreed to the arbitration provision
in the first place.”).

50.

Adam J. Levitin, Nancy S. Kim, Christina L. Kunz, Peter Linzer, Patricia
A. McCoy, Juliet M. Moringiello, Elizabeth A. Renuart & Lauren E.
Willis, The Faulty Foundation of the Draft Restatement of Consumer
Contracts, 36 Yale J. on Regul. 447, 460, 463 & n.69 (2019) (critiquing

102

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Arbitration and Rule Production

shrinkwrap cases identified by the Reporters likewise involved
arbitration clauses.51 More recent online consumer contract-formation
cases have been even more likely to arise out of challenges to the
enforceability of arbitration clauses.52 In other words, cases involving
contract-formation issues continue to give rise to court precedent even
when the parties’ contract includes an arbitration clause.53
Critics of the Reporters’ empirical study have asserted that “[c]ases
involving arbitration clause enforcement are substantively different
from regular contract disputes because they are decided in the context
of a federal statute and the resulting policy that strongly favors
enforcement of arbitration clauses.”54 As a legal matter, that statement
is incorrect for cases involving contract-formation issues. The U.S.
Supreme Court has made clear that the federal policy in support of
arbitration and the corresponding “presumption of arbitrability” apply
only after a court finds that an arbitration agreement has been formed.55
a sample for including cases involving the enforceability of arbitration
agreements) (noting that 38 of 98, or 39%, of cases addressing clickwrap
contracts “involved attempts to enforce arbitration agreements”); see also
id. at 458 n.44 (“69 of the 88 cases listed in the modification database[—
a sample of cases involving modification of standard form terms, also
collected by the Reporters—](78% of the cases) involved enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate.”).
51.

Based on data supplied by Florencia Marotta-Wurgler from the
Restatement empirical study, 12 of 19 (or 63%) of the sample of
browsewrap cases involved enforcement of arbitration clauses; of the
sample of clickwrap cases, 42 of 69 (or 61%) involved enforcement of
arbitration clauses. For further description of the Restatement data, see
Restatement of the L.: Consumer Conts. § 2 reporters’ notes, at
46–50 (Am. L. Inst., Tentative Draft 2019).

52.

The Restatement sample was limited to cases decided before 2015. Levitin
et al., supra note 50, at 464. From 2015 to the present, 15 of 17 (88%)
consumer contract-formation cases, with published opinions from U.S.
courts of appeals and state supreme courts, involved the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. The cases were collected by reviewing cases that
cited the cases in the Restatement sample, as well as Westlaw word
searches. For a list of the cases, see the Appendix.

53.

As such, these data appear inconsistent with the “surmise” of Professors
Samuel Issacharoff and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler that “[e]lectronic
contracts are . . . impoverished in terms of nuanced case law” at least in
part due to “the rise of mandatory arbitration.” Issacharoff & MarottaWurgler, supra note 12, at 635, 607–08. If anything, the data seem to
suggest the contrary.

54.

Levitin et al., supra note 50, at 458.

55.

See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287,
301–02 (2010) (stating, in a labor arbitration case, that courts discharge
their duty to determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate
grievances by “applying the presumption of arbitrability only where a
validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about
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The “policy that strongly favors enforcement of arbitration clauses”
does not apply when courts are deciding whether a contract that
includes an arbitration clause (or a freestanding arbitration agreement)
is formed.
To be clear, I am not arguing that court cases addressing the
enforceability of arbitration clauses fully substitute for contract-law
cases decided in arbitration. Many common-law contract doctrines can
apply differently to different types of transactions or provisions, and
the separability doctrine and delegation clauses limit the issues courts
can decide when the parties have agreed to arbitrate.56 Moreover, the
fact that a case deals with the enforceability of an arbitration clause
might as a practical matter influence how the court applies contractlaw doctrine, either expanding or contracting application of the doctrine
depending on the court’s view of arbitration.57 Instead, my point is
simply to illustrate further the importance of properly defining the
relevant contracting market when evaluating the displacement
hypothesis.
Finally, there also is a geographic component to defining the
relevant contracting market. The use of arbitration clauses in at least
some types of contracts can vary systematically across jurisdictions.58
To the extent this is so, jurisdictions in which arbitration use is less
common might still produce court precedent that can be used (albeit
only persuasively) in a jurisdiction in which arbitration use is more
common. Take, for example, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
as applied to the sale of motor vehicles. If car dealers are less likely to
whether it covers the dispute at hand”); see also Jaludi v. Citigroup, 933
F.3d 246, 255 (3d Cir. 2019) (“In applying state law . . . [to decide
whether an arbitration agreement was formed], we do not invoke the
presumption of arbitrability.”); Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. v. Abbar, 761
F.3d 268, 274 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Because the parties here are disputing the
existence of an obligation to arbitrate, not the scope of an arbitration
clause, the general presumption in favor of arbitration does not apply.”);
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 743 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 574 U.S. 991 (2014) (“Goldman thus contests the existence, rather
than the scope, of an arbitration agreement, and, therefore, the
presumption in favor of arbitrability does not apply in this case.”).
56.

See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.

57.

See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case
Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & Pol. 645, 665–80 (1999)
(study of Alabama Supreme Court cases finding that “[b]usiness-funded
justices” ruled in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses and “plaintiffs’lawyer-funded justices” ruled against enforcing arbitration clauses).

58.

Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration Clauses in
Credit Card Agreements: An Empirical Study, 9 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 536, 560 (2012) (finding that credit card “[i]ssuers located in states
in which courts had held class arbitration waivers unenforceable are less
likely to use arbitration clauses, as compared to issuers in states that have
upheld class arbitration waivers or that have no decisions on point”).
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use arbitration clauses in, say, New York than in California, New York
courts might still produce precedents interpreting Article 2 that could
be used as persuasive precedents in California.
B. Classifying Contracting Markets

Once the relevant contracting market is defined, the next step in
the analysis is to determine the proportion of disputes in that
contracting market that are resolved in court and the proportion that
are resolved in arbitration. Relevant contracting markets can be
categorized by their use of arbitration (not their use of arbitration
clauses) as litigation-only, partial-arbitration, and arbitration-only
markets. Litigation-only markets are those in which most or all disputes
are resolved in court and not by arbitration. Partial-arbitration markets
are those in which some disputes are resolved in arbitration and others
are resolved in court. Arbitration-only markets are those in which most
or all disputes are resolved in arbitration. In reality, of course, the use
of arbitration is on a spectrum rather than falling into neat categories.
But using a categorical approach here helps to simplify the analysis.
Widespread use of arbitration clauses (or other forms of predispute
agreements to arbitrate) is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for a market to be characterized as arbitration-only.59 It is necessary
because the vast majority of arbitration proceedings arise out of
predispute arbitration agreements.60 Before a dispute arises, parties can
trade off the means of dispute resolution against other aspects of their
contract (such as price). Or there might be sufficient uncertainty about
what sorts of future disputes will arise that both parties, ex ante, might
see arbitration as beneficial. After a dispute arises, however, tradeoffs
in contract terms are no longer possible and the type of dispute that
will arise has become certain.61 Without widespread use of arbitration
clauses, it is unlikely that all or almost all disputes in a market will be
resolved in arbitration.
As a matter of federal law, contracts in some markets will not
include arbitration clauses—most notably motor-vehicle-franchise

59.

Conversely, limited use of arbitration clauses is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a market to be characterized as litigation-only,
depending on the extent to which parties enter into post-dispute
arbitration agreements in the market.

60.

Rutledge, supra note 32, at 280 (“At the empirical level, a variety of
empirical measures suggest that postdispute arbitration will not work.”);
Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
187, 209 n.128 (2006) (citing studies).

61.

Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 695, 746.
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contracts (contracts between motor-vehicle dealers and manufacturers)62 and home-mortgage contracts.63 In addition, many corporate
transactional contracts, at least contracts required to be filed with the
SEC (i.e., that are not in the ordinary course of business for the filing
company64) do not use arbitration clauses.65 At the other extreme,
customer and employment contracts in the securities industry all
require arbitration (although they except class actions).66 Almost all
storefront payday lenders and almost all storefront payday loan
contracts use arbitration clauses (at least in the states studied by the
CFPB),67 as do, apparently, all or almost all mobile-wireless-services
62.

15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2019).

63.

Id. § 1639c(e)(1).

64.

Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or
Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 433,
457–59 (2010).

65.

Julian Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! The Lack of Arbitration
Clauses in International Commercial Contracts, 58 Int’l Rev. L. &
Econ. 6, 11 (2019) (finding 19% of sample of domestic and international
contracts filed with SEC from 2000–2016 included arbitration clauses);
Sarath Sanga, A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration, 113 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1121, 1151 (2019) (same); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DePaul L. Rev.
335, 350–52 (2007) (finding that arbitration clauses “appear at about
twice the domestic rate when the contract includes a non-U.S. party . . . .
[H]owever, the international contracts, like the domestic contracts,
contain a low absolute rate of arbitration clauses: only about 20% of
international contracts contain them.”).

66.

Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, FINRA, r.
12200 & 12204(a), https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/printablecode-arbitration-procedure-12000 [https://perma.cc/7J4U-85K4] (last visited
Oct. 19, 2021); Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry
Disputes, FINRA, r. 13200 & 13204(a), https://www.finra.org/arbitrationmediation/printable-code-arbitration-procedure-13000 [https://perma.cc/
2E8R-R8PE] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021); see Jennifer J. Johnson &
Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of Shareholder Claims, 36 Sec.
Regul. L.J. 181, 182 (2008) (“[S]ince 1987, when the Supreme Court
validated the mandatory arbitration of disputes between investors and
their securities brokers, the law in this area has virtually disappeared.”
(footnote omitted)). The regulated nature of the securities industry might
help explain the widespread use of arbitration (and the exception for class
actions).

67.

CFPB, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 1028(a) § 2.3.4, at 22 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB Arbitration
Study], https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-studyreport-to-congress-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TB5J-NVA5] (“Extrapolating
to California, Florida, and Texas, 83.7% of the lenders use an arbitration
clause. Lenders with more locations were somewhat more likely to use

106

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Arbitration and Rule Production

contracts.68 In between are employment contracts (both with rank-andfile employees and corporate executives),69 franchise agreements,70 and
corporate licensing agreements.71
Credit-card agreements are an intermediate case as well but in a
different way. Back in 2009, over 95% of credit-card debt outstanding
was subject to arbitration clauses.72 With the partial settlement of an
antitrust suit against leading credit-card issuers, that percentage

arbitration clauses: 98.5% of licensed storefronts in our sample were
subject to contracts with arbitration clauses . . . .”).
68.

Id. § 2.3.6, at 26 (“Of the eight wireless services providers in the sample,
seven (87.5%) included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts as
of summer 2014. The one provider that did not use an arbitration clause
was one of the smallest in the sample, so that over 99.9% of subscribers
to these providers were parties to contracts that used arbitration
clauses.”). I say “apparently” because the CFPB study was limited to
what were then “the eight largest facilities-based providers of mobile
wireless services in the United States,” id. at 25, and did not include other
providers of mobile wireless services. See 2020 Communications
Marketplace Report, 36 FCC Rcd. 2945, 2949 (2020). To my knowledge,
no one has studied the dispute-resolution clauses used by these other
mobile-wireless-service providers.

69.

Sanga, supra note 65, at 1151 (finding that 42% of employment contracts
filed with SEC included arbitration clauses); Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Econ. Pol’y Inst., The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration
2 (2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatoryarbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-millionamerican-workers/ [https://perma.cc/FFH9-JUNJ] (“More than half—
53.9 percent—of nonunion private-sector employers have mandatory
arbitration procedures. Among companies with 1,000 or more employees,
65.1 percent have mandatory arbitration procedures.”); see also Elizabeth
C. Tippett & Bridget Schaaff, How Concepcion and Italian Colors Affected
Terms of Service Contracts in the Gig Economy, 70 Rutgers U. L. Rev.
459, 492 (2018) (“Even in 2016, one third of companies did not include
any form of arbitration clause . . . .”).

70.

See infra text accompanying notes 102–11.

71.

Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 65, at 350 (“33% of licensing agreements
[filed with the SEC] provided for arbitration.”). Another possible
intermediate case is bank-deposit-account agreements. The CFPB found
in its Arbitration Study that 44.4% of insured deposits, and only 7.7% of
banks, used arbitration clauses in their deposit account agreements.
CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 67, §2.3.2, at 15 fig.2. Updated
data on the use of arbitration clauses in bank-deposit-account agreements
are not available, however.

72.

Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 58, at 558 (“Measured by the dollar
value of credit card loans outstanding (which is highly correlated with the
number of credit card accounts), over 95.1 percent of credit card
agreements included arbitration clauses [as of December 31, 2009].”).
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dropped to just over 50% as of the end of 2013.73 It has now moved
back up, with, for example, Chase announcing in 2019 that it was
resuming the use of arbitration clauses in its credit-card agreements.74
As a result, somewhere between 63% and 75% of credit-card debt
outstanding currently is subject to an arbitration clause.75 Throughout
this entire period, however, the substantial majority of credit-card
issuers did not—and still do not—use arbitration clauses.76 As of
December 31, 2019, only 16.5% of credit-card issuers used arbitration
clauses in their standard form credit-card agreements.77

73.

CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 67, §2.3.1, at 10–11 & fig.1
(reporting “53.0% of credit card loans outstanding were subject to
arbitration clauses”).

74.

Emily Flitter, JPMorgan Chase Seeks to Prohibit Card Customers from
Suing, N.Y. Times (June 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/04/
business/jpmorgan-chase-credit-card-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/
HHU7-CFNP].

75.

Partial data on credit card issuer market share is available from the Nilson
Report. See Bianca Peter, Market Share by Credit Card Issuer (June 9,
2021), WalletHub https://wallethub.com/edu/cc/market-share-by-creditcard-issuer/25530 [https://perma.cc/973F-7MEQ] (providing data from
the Nilson Report). The CFPB provides a database of credit card
agreements. See Credit Card Agreement Database, CFPB [hereinafter
CFPB Credit Card Agreement Database], https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
credit-cards/agreements/ [https://perma.cc/4CZU-Z99H] (last visited Oct.
19, 2021). In June 2021, I used a combination of automated and manual
review to determine if the issuer’s agreement included an arbitration
clause. Of the top fifteen issuers according to the Nilson Report, eleven
(with a combined 63.89% market share) used arbitration clauses; four
(with a combined 24.55% market share), did not. Accordingly, the share
of the market subject to arbitration clauses ranges from a minimum of
63.89% to a maximum of 75.45%.

76.

See CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 67, § 2.3.1, at 10 fig.1 (only
15.8% of credit card issuers used arbitration clauses); Drahozal &
Rutledge, supra note 58, at 558 (“[O]nly 17.1 percent (51 of 298) of the issuers
in our sample used arbitration clauses in their cardholder agreements.”).

77.

CFPB Credit Card Agreement Database, supra note 75. Again, I used a
combination of automated and manual review to determine whether the
issuer’s agreement included an arbitration clause. Several issuers did not
provide their entire arbitration agreement to the CFPB (instead reporting
a summary of terms); I excluded these issuers from the sample. In the few
cases (seven) in which issuers provided multiple agreements to the CFPB,
some of which included arbitration clauses and some of which did not, I
coded the issuer as using an arbitration clause when the majority of
clauses provided for arbitration. The number of such issuers is small
enough that it does not materially affect the results. I did not consolidate
issuers in the CFPB database with common ownership, so that these data
are not perfectly comparable to prior studies. But any effect of
consolidation is likely to be small and to decrease reported arbitration
clause usage (because larger issuers are more likely to use arbitration
clauses than smaller issuers).
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But widespread use of arbitration clauses is not a sufficient
condition for a market to be characterized as arbitration-only, for at
least three reasons. First, many arbitration clauses carve out specified
claims or disputes from arbitration.78 Such “carve-outs” appear in a
wide variety of contracts.79 The most common types of claims carved
out of arbitration clauses are claims for injunctive relief, provisional
measures, and intellectual-property protections.80 To the extent a
relevant type of dispute is commonly carved out of arbitration clauses,
the contracting market is not arbitration-only, at least as to claims
likely to fall within the carve-out.
Second, consumers and employees81 might take advantage of the
opportunity provided by some arbitration clauses to opt out of the
obligation to arbitrate. While not ubiquitous, opt-outs in arbitration
clauses are not uncommon either.82 The available evidence suggests that
this opt-out option is rarely used.83 In certain contracting markets,
however, a sufficient number of individuals have opted out of
arbitration to justify a court in certifying a class consisting of persons
who opted out.84 In markets like those, the ability to opt out might keep
the market from being arbitration-only.
78.

Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling
Procedure: Carve-outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1945,
1950 (2014); Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, The
Essential Role of Courts for Supporting Innovation, 92 Tex. L. Rev.
2177, 2180 (2014).

79.

Drahozal & O’Hara O’Connor, supra note 78, at 1966.

80.

Id. at 1967, 1969.

81.

I use the term “employees” here broadly to include workers formally
classified as independent contractors, such as Uber drivers. See New Prime
Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (interpreting FAA “§ 1 to
exclude not only agreements between employers and employees but also
agreements that require independent contractors to perform work”).

82.

See CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 67, § 2.5.1, at 31 (reporting
from 14.3% of wireless arbitration clauses to 50.7% of storefront payday
loan arbitration clauses included opt-outs); Tippett & Schaaff, supra note
69, at 498 (“Gig companies have also been using ‘opt out’ provisions with
greater frequency, through which employees can decline to consent to
arbitration if they notify the company within a specified period.”).

83.

See Charlotte Garden, Disrupting Work Law: Arbitration in the Gig
Economy, 2017 U. Chi. Legal F. 205, 219 (2017) (“[T]he costs to gig
economy enterprises of offering an opportunity to opt out of [individual
arbitration clauses] seem to be small, as anecdotal evidence suggests that
few workers actually opt out.”).

84.

See, e.g., James v. Uber Techs. Inc., 338 F.R.D. 123, 130, 145 (N.D. Cal.
2021) (granting in part “motion to certify a class of [4,828] Uber drivers
who drove for Uber in the State of California between February 28, 2019
and December 16, 2020, and who opted out of Uber’s arbitration
agreement”); Congdon v. Uber Techs., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1024–
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Third, parties do not necessarily arbitrate all disputes subject to an
arbitration clause. A party can waive its right to arbitrate post-dispute
by not invoking the arbitration clause in a lawsuit.85 If both parties
waive their right to arbitrate, the dispute will be resolved in court even
though the parties’ contract includes an arbitration clause.
Data from the CFPB Arbitration Study illustrate the point. The
CFPB found that while consumer financial-services companies invoked
the arbitration clause in 65% (26 of 40) of class actions filed against
them, they invoked the arbitration clause in only 5.7% (8 of 140) of
individual actions.86 The CFPB was not able to determine the reason
for the low invocation rate in individual cases (or for the less than 100%
invocation rate in class actions). And more research is necessary to
determine if the CFPB’s finding extends to businesses other than
financial-services companies, as well as to understand why businesses
do not always invoke arbitration clauses.87 But the CFPB’s finding
provides yet another reason why widespread use of arbitration clauses
does not necessarily make a market arbitration-only.88
C. Changes in the Use of Arbitration Clauses Since Concepcion

As explained above, widespread use of arbitration clauses is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for a contracting market to be
arbitration-only. This Subpart considers how likely it is that
substantially all contracts in a relevant contracting market—
particularly one involving standard form adhesion contracts—will
include arbitration clauses. After the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011

25 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that Uber breached contract with its drivers
and certifying damages class of persons who “opted-out of arbitration
under the last Uber driver contract the person executed”).
85.

E.g., Restatement of the L: The U.S. L. of Int’l Com. & Inv.State Arb. § 2.20(a), at 336 (Am. L. Inst., Proposed Final Draft 2019).

86.

CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 67, § 6, at 61.

87.

One possible reason is suggested in Part II: that businesses can selectively
invoke arbitration clauses to litigate cases they perceive as likely to make
favorable law while avoiding cases they perceive as likely to make
unfavorable law. See infra text accompanying notes 136–51.

88.

Professor Gilles neglects this possibility when she asserts that the use of
arbitration clauses to avoid class actions necessarily also prevents courts
from resolving “individual claims based on the same contracts that
companies will alter in their efforts to avoid class exposure.” Gilles, supra
note 3, at 413. She argues: “Like dolphins that get swept up in tuna nets,
entire categories of non-class claims are certain to find themselves in
arbitration as companies seek to exploit the benefits handed them in
Concepcion and Italian Colors.” Id. at 413–14. Her argument assumes
that businesses using arbitration clauses to avoid class actions will always
invoke arbitration clauses in individual cases as well. As the CFPB study
illustrates, such an assumption can be unwarranted.
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decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,89 some commentators
predicted that every business would soon use arbitration clauses in their
standard form contracts with consumers and employees.90 Because
arbitration reduces business exposure to class actions, these
commentators reasoned, every business would want to switch to
arbitration.91 Indeed, they argued, lawyers who do not recommend that
their clients use arbitration clauses might even be committing legal
malpractice.92
Certainly, the use of arbitration clauses in consumer and
employment contracts has increased since Concepcion. A number of
high-profile businesses—including companies such as Sony, Microsoft,
Netflix, eBay, and PayPal—adopted arbitration clauses for their
consumer contracts after Concepcion was decided.93 More recently,
however, media outlets have reported businesses ending their use of
arbitration clauses. Some companies, such as Microsoft, Facebook, and
some high-profile banks and law firms, stopped requiring the use of
arbitration to resolve sexual-harassment claims.94 Others, such as
Google, Adobe, and Intuit, stopped requiring arbitration for all

89.

In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted California courts’ use of unconscionability doctrine to
invalidate a provision permitting only individual and not class arbitration.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)
(“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme
inconsistent with the FAA.”); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236–37 (2013) (rejecting argument that arbitration
clause with class waiver was invalid because it precluded “effective
vindication” of the federal antitrust laws).

90.

See supra text accompanying note 17.

91.

See Fitzpatrick, supra note 17, at 174.

92.

See Gilles, supra note 17, at 377 (“Why wouldn’t they? Once the [class]
waivers gain broader acceptance and recognition, it will become
malpractice for corporate counsel not to include such clauses in consumer
and other class-action-prone contracts.”).

93.

Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration
Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and Amex, 67
Vand. L. Rev. 955, 1001 tbl.3 (2014).

94.

E.g., Samantha Cooney, Microsoft Won’t Make Women Settle Sexual
Harassment Cases Privately Anymore. Here’s Why That Matters, Time
(Dec. 19, 2017, 5:19 PM), https://time.com/5071726/microsoft-sexualharassment-forced-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/2FQL-XEKA]; Angela
Morris, Why 3 BigLaw Firms Ended Use of Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses, ABA J. (June 1, 2018, 12:15 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/
magazine/article/biglaw_mandatory_arbitration_clauses [https://perma.cc/
F7UV-R97H] (Munger Tolles, Orrick, and Skadden).
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employment disputes.95 Amazon, facing over 75,000 individual
arbitration claims by users of its Echo product, removed the arbitration
clause from its terms of service for consumer products.96
The empirical evidence on the change in arbitration-clause use
likewise is mixed. (By comparison, the available evidence suggests that
the use of arbitration clauses in corporate transactional contracts has
remained steady over time.97) In its Arbitration Study, the CFPB found
an increased use of arbitration clauses in credit-card contracts and
checking-account contracts through 2013, but not to the degree
predicted by these commentators.98 The data presented above show that
a similar pattern continues for credit-card agreements.99 Elizabeth C.
Tippett & Bridget Schaaff reached similar conclusions about “gig
economy” workers,100 while a study of firms with “substantial market
share and widespread name-recognition” from “six industries that
consumers interact with on an almost daily basis” found a substantial
increase in the use of arbitration clauses, but one that varied depending
on the industry.101

95.

Rakeen Mabud, Google Put an End to Forced Arbitration—And Why That’s
So Important, Forbes (Feb. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/rakeenmabud/2019/02/26/worker-organizing-results-in-big-changeat-google/?sh=71f6cdc54399 [https://perma.cc/2ZFW-2H2L].

96.

Sara Randazzo, Amazon Faced 75,000 Arbitration Demands. Now It Says:
Fine, Sue Us, Wall St. J. (June 1, 2021, 7:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/amazon-faced-75-000-arbitration-demands-now-it-says-fine-sueus-11622547000 [https://perma.cc/U8HV-YNY7].

97.

See Nyarko, supra note 65, at 12–13 (“For arbitration, the rates between
domestic and international contracts are very similar and remained
stagnant over the period of examination [from 2000–2016].”); Sanga, supra
note 65, at 1151 (“The arbitration rate for employment and non-employment
contracts has been roughly constant for the last twenty years.”).

98.

CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 67, § 2.3.1, at 17 (“Overall, the
limited data provide evidence of only a slight move toward arbitration in
checking account contracts since the 2013 Preliminary Results, but a
somewhat larger move between 2012 and 2013.”).

99.

See supra text accompanying notes 72–77.

100. Tippett & Schaaff, supra note 69, at 492 (“About forty percent of
companies do not appear to have modified their contracts in light of
Concepcion or Italian Colors.”).
101. Ryan Miller, Next-Gen Arbitration: An Empirical Study of How
Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Form Contracts Have Changed
After Concepcion and American Express, 32 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 793,
803–04 (2019) (studying 100 businesses classified as “Telecom, ECommerce, Entertainment, Apps and Internet Services, Consumer
Electronics, and Credit Cards”). The percentage of companies in the
sample using arbitration clauses increased from 22.3% to 66.0% from 2008
to 2018, id. at 806, with the change by industry varying as follows:
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Bo Rutledge and I studied a sample of franchise agreements and
found that, while the use of arbitration clauses in those agreements
increased following Concepcion, many franchisors did not switch to
arbitration.102 Franchisors face the risk of class actions brought by their
similarly situated franchisees, and lawyers recommend that franchisors
use arbitration clauses if they wish to reduce that risk.103 But while
franchise agreements often have been grouped together with consumer
and employment contracts as standard form contracts provided on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis to “little guys,”104 franchise agreements differ in
potentially important ways.105 Accordingly, as Professor Rutledge and
I stated previously, “one must be cautious not to extrapolate too

[C]redit card companies remained stable in their use of these
[arbitration] agreements, while online shopping sites, streaming
and entertainment services, and apps and internet services all saw
a much more marked increase. While there was some movement
in consumer electronics, the increase in this category was
relatively small compared to those of other industries.
Id. at 807 (footnote omitted).
102. Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 93, at 991–97.
103. E.g., Doug Knox, Arbitration Pacts in Franchising: One Size Doesn’t Fit
All, Law360 (May 22, 2019, 11:10 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1160386/arbitration-pacts-in-franchising-one-size-doesn-t-fit-all [https://
perma.cc/AB6H-M3YV] (“[T]he prospect of enforcing class actions
waivers remains the one factor that persuades many franchisors to include
arbitration provisions in their franchise agreements.”); Kevin A. Adams,
Does Arbitration Make Sense for Franchisors? A Litigator’s Perspective, St.
Bar Cal.: Bus. L. News, no. 3, 2017, at 23, 26, https://mulcahy.blob.core.
windows.net/sitedocs/pdf/businesslawnewsissue32017doesarbitrationmak
esenseforfrancer-7688.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DQD-Q7ZK] (“Arguably, the
most significant benefit to large franchisors coming from the FAA preemption cases is the almost certain enforceability of class action waivers
built into the agreements to arbitrate.”); Edward Wood Dunham, The
Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 Franchise L.J. 141, 141
(1997).
104. For example, early versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act made
predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable in consumer,
employment, and franchise agreements. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4(1) (2009) (amending 9 U.S.C. § 2). See
generally George Padis, Note, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming
Consumer and Employment Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 Tex. L.
Rev. 665, 669 n.20 (2013) (“Often, franchise agreements are lumped
together with employment agreements and consumer contracts as
problematic areas of adhesive bargaining, because franchisees are often
small businesses dealing with large corporations, and thus lack the
bargaining strength to negotiate arbitration clauses in advance.”).
105. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 93, at 998 (noting that “franchise
agreements have higher stakes, longer terms, and are subject to more
regulation than the typical consumer or employment contract”).
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broadly from our findings here [on franchise agreements] to other
standard form contracts.”106
The rest of this Subpart provides updated data on changes in the
use of arbitration clauses in franchise agreements since Concepcion.
While the use of arbitration clauses has increased since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Concepcion, it remains the case that a substantial
number of franchisors continue not to include arbitration clauses in
their standard form agreements.
The sample of franchise agreements studied here consists of the top
seventy-five franchises listed in Entrepreneur Magazine’s Franchise 500
in 1999 for which franchise agreements were available at the Minnesota
Department of Commerce.107 The data have been updated periodically,
and in recent years annually, from the Minnesota Department of
Commerce web page,108 supplemented by agreements from the web site
of the Wisconsin Department of Financial Institutions.109 Because of
franchisors either going out of business or restricting the states in which
they do business, the sample now consists of 63 franchises tracked from
1999 through 2020.110

106. Id.
107. For further description of the sample, see id. at 987–90. For a comparison
of the sample to a random sample of all franchise agreements filed with
the Minnesota Department of Commerce, see id. at 991–94.
108. Welcome to CARDS: Commerce Actions and Regulatory Documents
Search, Minn. Dept. of Commerce, https://www.cards.commerce.state.
mn.us/CARDS/ [https://perma.cc/KQ8W-T7SY] (last visited June 22, 2021).
109. Franchise Search, Wis. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., https://www.wdfi.org/apps/
FranchiseSearch/MainSearch.aspx [https://perma.cc/XS33-XALQ] (last
visited June 22, 2021).
110. Two franchise agreements are not available for 2014, two for 2015, and
two for 2016. Two of those six franchise agreements were for the same
franchisor (in 2014 and 2015), while the others were all for different
franchisors. Of the five franchisors, one used an exclusive forum-selection
clause for the entire period studied, both before and after the missing year,
so I coded the clause for the missing year as an exclusive forum-selection
clause. Another used an arbitration clause for the entire period, so I coded
the missing year as an arbitration clause. A third used an exclusive forumselection clause for the entire period both before and after the missing
year, except for 1999. I coded the missing year as an exclusive forumselection clause. The other two franchisors used an exclusive forumselection clause before the missing year (or years) but an arbitration clause
after the missing year. In other words, they both switched to arbitration,
either during the missing year (or years) or immediately after. In both
cases, I coded the franchisor as switching to arbitration at the earliest of
the possible dates.
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Figure 1 shows the percentage of franchise agreements in the sample
that used arbitration clauses from 1999 through 2020. From 1999
through 2011, the percentage of franchise agreements using arbitration
clauses was below 50% and declining slightly. After Concepcion was
decided in 2011, the percentage increased every year to a high of 54%
in 2016. But in 2017, the percentage of franchise agreements with
arbitration clauses declined to 52.4%, where it remained in 2018 and
2019. Indeed, in that year, two franchisors switched from arbitration
clauses to exclusive forum-selection clauses, while one franchisor
switched to arbitration, for a net decline of one. In 2020,111 two

Figure 1: Use of Arbitration Clauses in Franchise
Agreements, 1999-2020
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franchisors switched from exclusive forum-selection clauses to
arbitration clauses, so that the percentage of franchise agreements with
arbitration clauses was at 55.6%. As of the end of 2020, almost ten
years after Concepcion (and seven years after Italian Colors), almost

111. As of June 1, 2021, the 2020 Franchise Disclosure Documents for two of
the franchisors in the sample were still not available from either the
Minnesota or Wisconsin databases. The data as reported in Figure 1
assume that those two franchisors used the same dispute-resolution clause
in 2020 that they did in 2019, which for both franchisors was an exclusive
forum-selection clause.
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half of the franchise agreements in the sample still did not include
arbitration clauses.
The question then is: what explains these anecdotal and empirical
results? Why do some businesses not use arbitration clauses? Why have
some businesses moved away from arbitration? In my view, the reasons
vary. In some cases, the reason for the move from arbitration was
reputational: law firms and tech companies, for example, were suffering
reputational losses with current and prospective employees (and others)
by continuing to use arbitration to resolve sexual-harassment claims or
employment disputes more generally.112 In other cases, the reason is
cost. Sometimes, the added process costs of arbitration (in addition to
the possible need to defend the arbitration clause in court) might deter
companies from choosing arbitration.113 Other times the arbitration fees
incurred by companies such as Amazon facing mass individual
arbitrations create huge settlement leverage in favor of plaintiffs,
overriding any potential cost savings from eliminating class actions.114
112. See, e.g., Leslie P. Norton, Tesla’s Sustainability Cred Is Being Challenged
with Shareholder Proposals at Annual Meeting, Barron’s (Sept. 17, 2020,
7:15 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/teslas-sustainability-reputationwill-be-challenged-with-shareholder-proposals-51600341300 [https://
perma.cc/DQY4-TWLZ] (“Such changes [(including changes to Tesla’s
employment arbitration policy)] are necessary to long-term success, say
proponents of sustainable investing, because they make the company more
attractive to potential employees, customers and the community.”).
113. E.g., Adams, supra note 103, at 24 (“If the arbitration is substantially
shorter than the court action, then there should be a proportionate
reduction in attorneys’ fees. However, if the duration of each proceeding
is substantially similar . . . commercial arbitration is not a viable costsaving option to litigation in court.”).
114. As the CFPB noted in the Preliminary Results from its arbitration study,
individuals with past due credit-card debts figured out that the
asymmetric arbitration fees agreed to by businesses gave the debtors
leverage in settlement negotiations. See CFPB, Arbitration Study
Preliminary Results: Section 1028(a) Study Results to Date
§ 4.9.1, at 112–13 n.279 (2013), reprinted in CFPB Arbitration Study,
supra note 67, app. A at 112–13 n.279. Plaintiffs’ law firms, in particular
the firm of Keller Lenker LLC, have been using the same technique on a
much larger scale. E.g., Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
‘Scared to Death’ by Arbitration: Companies Drowning in Their Own
System, N.Y. Times (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/
business/arbitration-overload.html [https://perma.cc/9CED-ZHRF]. In
response, some arbitral institutions have changed their fee structures for
multiple consumer and employment case filings to reduce the asymmetries. E.g., Am. Arb. Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Rules: Costs
of Arbitration 1 (2020), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer_
Fee_Schedule_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5VZ-B4PM]; Am. Arb. Ass’n,
Employment/Workplace Fee Schedule: Costs of Arbitration 3,
(2020), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Employment_Fee_Schedule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D42B-WTE4]. The effect the fee changes will have on
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Another explanation, likely at work in the credit-card and franchise
settings, is that an arbitration clause is not solely a class-action waiver;
it brings with it a bundle of other dispute-resolution procedures, such
as reduced appellate review of decisions.115 Businesses that face a low
risk of class actions might prefer to have their disputes resolved in court
instead of arbitration, retaining the ability to appeal unfavorable
decisions (or to use other court procedures that they prefer).116
Again, my point here is not that all contracting markets will remain
partial-arbitration markets. It is certainly possible that the use of
arbitration clauses will be widespread in some, if not many, contracting
markets—possibly even including franchise agreements, although the
evidence continues not to support that view. My point instead is that
one should not simply assume that all contracting markets, even
markets involving consumers and employees, necessarily will have
widespread use of arbitration clauses.

II. Rule Production in a Partial-Arbitration Market
and the Displacement Hypothesis
As the preceding Part explains, some contracting markets currently
are partial-arbitration markets—markets in which some disputes are
resolved in arbitration and some are resolved in court. This Part
examines how an increased but only partial use of arbitration is likely
to affect the production of precedent in the court cases that remain—
that is, to what extent an increase in arbitration will displace court
precedent.117
The answer, central to evaluating the displacement hypothesis, is
not straightforward. The amount of court precedent might decline as
the number of disputes resolved in arbitration increases—that is, there
might be a simple, negative relationship between the two. But that is
mass arbitrations, and the incentive of businesses to use arbitration
clauses, remains to be seen.
115. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 93, at 1012 (“An arbitration clause
does more than waive class actions. It brings with it other characteristics
of the arbitration bundle of dispute services, discouraging businesses from
using arbitration even after Concepcion and Amex.”).
116. See Knox, supra note 103 (“On the one hand, and at one extreme, the
prospect of defending a franchise system-wide class action over multiple
years in a court of law will not sit well with most franchisors. On the
other hand, and at the other extreme, the risk of an adverse ruling by a
runaway arbitrator with no right of judicial review persuades many
franchisors to prefer litigation.”).
117. In a partial-arbitration market, rule production might also occur in
arbitration. The next Part analyzes that possibility in an arbitration-only
market. Interactions between rule production in court and in arbitration
in a partial-arbitration market are possible but beyond the scope of this
Article.
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not necessarily so, and ultimately depends on how one models the
production of precedent by courts. Indeed, under one plausible scenario,
an increase in the use of arbitration might have no effect on the
production of court precedent. This Part first describes several models
of precedent production and their limitations. It then develops a
strategic model of precedent production, extending Marc Galanter’s
Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead118 to the context of arbitration and
rule production.
A. Models of Court Precedent Production

Models of the production of court precedent focus on either the
demand side or the supply side (or both) of precedent production.119
Demand-side models look at how party demand for court precedent is
likely to influence its production.120 The early literature on the efficiency
of the common law is an example. In its simplest form, that literature
models the incentives parties have to challenge inefficient legal rules as
tending to move the common law toward efficiency.121 By comparison,
supply-side models focus on the characteristics of and constraints on
suppliers of precedent (such as judges’ incentives and procedural rules)
and analyze how they are likely to influence the production of
precedent.122
In supporting the displacement hypothesis, some commentators
seem to posit or assume a simple negative relationship between the use
of arbitration and the production of precedent. According to Lord
Neuberger, for example: “One of the disadvantages of an increase in
[arbitration] awards and a concomitant decrease in judgments,
particularly in the common law world, is that the law does not develop,

118. See generally Galanter, supra note 21.
119. Cf. Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law:
A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1551, 1554–65 (2003)
(examining demand-side and supply-side models of efficiency in the
common law).
120. Id. at 1552.
121. E.g., Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Legal
Stud. 51, 55 (1977) (“If only one party to a dispute is interested in future
cases of this sort, there will be pressure for precedents to evolve in favor
of that party which does have a stake in future cases, whether or not this
is the efficient solution. This is because a party with a stake in future
decision[s] will find it worthwhile to litigate as long as liability rests with
him; conversely, a party with no stake in future decisions will not find
litigation worthwhile.”).
122. Cf. Zywicki, supra note 119, at 1565. See generally Richard A. Posner,
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993).
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that it becomes ossified.”123 On this view, as the use of arbitration
increases the production of precedent decreases, perhaps linearly.
A model that would support such a prediction is one which assumes
that (1) precedent is produced randomly in litigated cases and (2)
arbitration randomly displaces cases being litigated. If precedent is
produced randomly in cases being litigated—such as if parties seek to
resolve disputes in court without regard to any precedent created by
the court’s decisions—then reducing the number of litigated cases might
reduce the amount of precedent produced linearly, at least on average.
And if arbitration displaces cases being litigated at random, then an
increase in the amount of arbitration would reduce the number of
litigated cases, again linearly on average.
Assume, for example, that 10% of all litigated cases (at random)
result in precedential opinions and that each case arbitrated replaces a
case that otherwise would be litigated. Under those assumptions,
increasing the number of arbitrations in a particular market by, say,
500, would reduce the number of court cases by 500. If 10% of those
court cases would have resulted in a precedential opinion, the increase
in arbitration would result in a decrease in the production of precedent
(under this simple model) on average by 50 precedential opinions.
But there is strong reason to believe that the production of
precedent from litigated cases is not random. Marc Galanter has written
that one of the reasons the “haves” come out ahead is that repeat
players can “play for rules in litigation itself.”124 The literature on the
efficiency of the common law assumes that parties expend more
resources on some cases than others, rather than litigating cases at
random.125 Likewise, models of the decision to settle rather than litigate
disputes assume that parties behave strategically in deciding whether
to settle, rather than that parties choose the cases to settle at random.126
If court precedent does not develop randomly, then the relationship
between arbitration and precedent production becomes less clear and
the displacement hypothesis less certain. Perhaps the fewer firms
continuing to litigate can maintain the pre-arbitration level of
precedent production.127 Previously, those firms might have been free

123. Neuberger, supra note 7, at para. 24 (emphasis added).
124. Galanter, supra note 21, at 100.
125. See supra text accompanying note 121.
126. E.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 12–17 (1984).
127. See Allan Erbsen, Common Law in the Age of Arbitration, JOTWELL
(Sept. 23, 2016), https://courtslaw.jotwell.com/common-law-in-the-ageof-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/ZR3B-7ZLF] (reviewing Gilles, supra
note 3) (“A decline in the number of cases that courts adjudicate does not
necessarily mean that rules will stagnate. What matters is whether the
remaining cases provide a sufficient foundation for innovation.”).
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riding on the efforts of other firms to create court precedent.128 When
the other firms switch to arbitration, the remaining firms can no longer
free ride. Instead, the remaining firms might take the place of the
arbitrating firms in seeking to create precedent. If so, then the
remaining firms might create important precedent for an industry, as a
single payday lender seems to have done in Florida in the 1990s.129 Or
maybe, as Scott Baker has suggested, high-risk employers (i.e., ones
more likely to discriminate against employees) tend to opt for
arbitration, while low-risk employers remain in court.130 If so, court
precedent would be “based on cases against low-risk employers, not
high-risk employers,” and “the law might evolve in favor of
employers.”131
The next Subpart develops in more detail a model of strategic
precedent production, building on Galanter’s insights about the “haves”
versus the “have nots.”
B. Strategic Precedent Production and Arbitration

Among the reasons why the “haves” come out ahead, as described
by Marc Galanter in his classic article, is that repeat players can “play
for rules in litigation itself.”132 According to Galanter, repeat players
have an incentive to invest in litigating cases likely to result in favorable
precedent and to “‘settle’ cases where they expect[] unfavorable rule
outcomes.”133 By comparison, non-repeat players (“one-shotters” in
Galanter’s parlance) “should be willing to trade off the possibility of
making ‘good law’ for tangible gain.”134 As a result, “we would expect
the body of ‘precedent’ cases—that is, cases capable of influencing the
outcome of future cases—to be relatively skewed toward those favorable
to [repeat players].”135 This view of the strategic use of the litigation
128. Cf. Rubin, supra note 121, at 60 (“[A] party of type A may decide not to
litigate a case, even if such litigation would be efficient, in the hope that
some other A may do the litigating and save the original A court
costs. . . . [W]e might expect some free rider problems. Our model would
predict, for example, that large companies would be involved relatively
more in litigation than would small companies.”).
129. Christopher R. Drahozal, Buckeye Check Cashing and the Separability
Doctrine, 1 Yb. on Arb. & Mediation 55, 67–68 (2009). But see
Alderman, supra note 2, at 13 (“With only the occasional opportunity for
creating law, the process of reformulating that law as times change would
be gone.”).
130. See generally Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory
Arbitration, 83 Or. L. Rev. 861 (2004).
131. Id. at 887.
132. Galanter, supra note 21, at 100.
133. Id. at 101.
134. Id. at 102.
135. Id.
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process—including the strategic bringing and settling of claims—to
influence the production of court precedent is widely held.136
On the view that businesses as repeat players seek to obtain
favorable precedent in court, why would they use an arbitration clause
in their contract and give up the possibility of that favorable precedent?
One possibility is that repeat players might use arbitration clauses in
lieu of settlement to influence production of precedent in court.137
A simple model illustrates the point. The model assumes two
parties, a repeat player and a non-repeat player. The case is one in
which the repeat player anticipates some probability that a court
decision will be precedential, i.e., will make law. The non-repeat player
has no interest in any law created by the case because it does not expect
136. E.g., Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Defender General, 168 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1469, 1483 (2020) (“Galanter’s distinction captures an important
dynamic in Supreme Court criminal litigation. The two sides are playing
fundamentally different games. The government plays for the rules,
whereas each criminal defendant (and that defendant’s lawyer) must play
to win the case.”); Jason Iuliano, The Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap, 70
Duke L.J. 497, 527 (2020) (“Student loan creditors are able to identify
which discharge cases they will win and aggressively litigate those disputes
to obtain favorable precedent. At the same time, these creditors offer
generous settlements to debtors who are likely to prevail on the merits.
Given debtors’ one-shotter status and their corresponding risk aversion,
they are eager to accept settlements. Ultimately, this dual-pronged
approach allows creditors to develop significant favorable precedent while
eliminating the potential for any unfavorable precedent.” (footnote
omitted)); Yeon-Koo Che & Jong Goo Yi, The Role of Precedents in
Repeated Litigation, 9 J.L., Econ., & Org. 399, 417 (1993) (“[W]e have
shown first that the defendant is more willing to settle when an
unfavorable precedent is more likely to be set, resulting in a higher
settlement rate. Second, the parties will engage in preemptive campaigns
to turn the precedent in their favor, which could be socially wasteful.”);
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 534 (1991) (“[R]epeat
players can expect principles and positions established in particular cases
(such as a no-settlement policy or a judicial determination about the
requirements of scienter) to have effects on future cases in which they will
be involved. One-shot players who expect to be involved in only one
litigation will not realize such benefits. For them, there is no long run;
there is only now.”).
137. There are, of course, other possible explanations as well. First, the
precedent might have no value in arbitration if arbitrators do not consider
the law in making their decisions. The available empirical evidence does
not, however, support such a strong conclusion about arbitral
decisionmaking. See Drahozal, supra note 61, at 203. Second, and
conversely, arbitrators might treat other arbitral awards as creating law
and the business might believe that the law created by arbitrators will be
more favorable than the law created in courts. Third, if an arbitration
clause works as a complete waiver of a claim, then the business might
receive little benefit from any favorable law. But even if no private
disputes are litigated or arbitrated, businesses might still value favorable
law in, say, dealing with public enforcement authorities.
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to have any future cases. The repeat player, by comparison, has an
interest in the law that might be created by the case, which will either
be favorable to the repeat player in future cases (on average) or
unfavorable to the repeat player in future cases (on average). I assume
that the costs and benefits of the case are such that a repeat-player
plaintiff will file suit when the action is expected to create no law or
favorable law, but will not file suit if the case is expected to create
unfavorable law. By comparison, a non-repeat player will file suit
regardless of whether the case is likely to create law that is favorable
or unfavorable to the repeat player and will prefer to litigate in court
than to arbitrate. I also assume that dispute-resolution costs and
deterrence benefits are the same in court as in arbitration,138 and that
court opinions create law while arbitral awards do not.139 Finally, the
parties are assumed to face zero transaction costs in entering into
settlements.
In a contracting market without arbitration, the expected behavior
of the repeat player is summarized in the third column of Table 1. If
the repeat player is the plaintiff and expects the case to create favorable
law, the repeat player will file suit and litigate the case. As plaintiff, it
has control over whether to file suit, and will benefit from the favorable
law it expects to be created. If the repeat player is the plaintiff and
expects the case to create unfavorable law, it will not file suit. Because
of the costs from the unfavorable law the case is expected to create, the
net benefit from filing suit is negative. Note that under the simplifying
assumptions of the model, this is a case that the repeat-player plaintiff
would have filed but for the expected unfavorable law that would result.
Table 1. Repeat-Player Strategies in Court and Arbitration
Expected Outcome
No Arbitration
Repeat Player
RP Plaintiff
Favorable Law
File Suit
RP Plaintiff
Unfavorable Law
Do Not File Suit
RP Defendant
Favorable Law
Defend Action
RP Defendant
Unfavorable Law
Settle

Arbitration
File Suit
Arbitrate
Defend Action
Arbitrate

Next, assume that the repeat player is the defendant in a lawsuit
brought by a non-repeat player. If the repeat-player defendant expects
the case to create favorable law, it will defend the action and continue
litigating the case. Note that the non-repeat player will file the action
because the favorable law (for the repeat player) will have no effect on
the non-repeat player, which will not have any future cases.140 If the
138. See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims:
An Economic Analysis, 8 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 209, 223–28 (2000).
139. This assumption is considered in the next Part.
140. If the non-repeat player recognizes that the case is likely to create favorable law for the repeat player, it might behave strategically by threatening
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repeat-player defendant expects the case to make unfavorable law,
however, the repeat player will settle the case with the non-repeat
player, paying a premium to settle if necessary to prevent the
unfavorable law from being created. This latter case is the one described
by Galanter in Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead.141
How does arbitration change this analysis? By agreeing to arbitrate
pre-dispute, typically through an arbitration clause in the parties’
contract, a party agrees not to bring any claims in court. Instead, it
agrees that any claims must be resolved in arbitration. A party can
waive the right to arbitrate, and if both parties do so the dispute will
be resolved in court instead of arbitration.142 But when the parties have
agreed pre-dispute to arbitrate, either party can invoke that right postdispute and have the case sent to arbitration without further agreement
from the other party.
Accordingly, in a contracting market in which a repeat player and
a non-repeat player have agreed to arbitration pre-dispute, the expected
behavior of the repeat player is summarized in the fourth column of
Table 1. If the repeat player is the plaintiff and expects the case to
create favorable law, the repeat player will file suit and litigate the case
as it would have done without an arbitration clause. By doing so it
waives its right to arbitrate. In theory, the non-repeat player could seek
to stay the court case pending arbitration, or at least threaten to do so;
such a threat would give the non-repeat player some degree of leverage
given the value of the favorable law to the repeat player. It is not clear,
however, how the non-repeat player would be able obtain value from
the threat.
If the repeat player is the plaintiff and expects the case to create
unfavorable law, it will not file suit. But it will file a claim in
arbitration. Under the assumptions of the model this is a case that the
repeat-player plaintiff would have filed but for the expected unfavorable
law that would result from filing suit in court. Arbitration allows the
repeat player to bring claims it otherwise would not bring (assuming,
of course, that arbitral awards do not create law).
Next, assume that the repeat player is the defendant in a lawsuit
brought by a non-repeat player. If the repeat-player defendant expects
the case to create favorable law, it will waive the right to arbitrate,
defend the action, and continue litigating the case. (The non-repeat
player likely will waive its right to arbitrate by litigating the suit as
plaintiff.) The result here is the same as without an arbitration clause.

to dismiss the case unless the repeat player gives it some incentive to
continue. What that incentive would be, and whether this sort of collusive
litigation would actually occur, is uncertain.
141. Galanter, supra note 21, at 100–02.
142. See supra text accompanying note 85.
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When the repeat-player defendant expects the case to create
unfavorable law, however, the repeat player no longer needs to pay a
premium to the non-repeat player to settle the case to prevent the
unfavorable law from being created. Instead, the repeat player can stay
the litigation pending arbitration, in which, again, the arbitrators’
award is assumed not to create any law. The ultimate result is the same
with and without an arbitration clause: the repeat player will be able
to avoid the creation of unfavorable law. But the mechanism by which
the repeat-player accomplishes that end is different.
In sum, under the assumptions of this simple model, the use of
arbitration clauses does not affect the production of court precedent.
The repeat player still gets favorable law made and avoids the
production of unfavorable law. Instead, arbitration potentially benefits
the repeat player in two different ways. First, arbitration clauses enable
the repeat player to bring claims it otherwise would not bring because
of the risk of unfavorable law—but in arbitration rather than court
(assuming, again, that arbitral awards do not create law). Second,
arbitration clauses might enable a repeat player to avoid paying a
settlement premium in cases expected to create unfavorable law,
redistributing wealth from the non-repeat player to the repeat player.
Richard Alderman makes a point similar to this latter one but
posits a different mechanism: that the repeat player will adjust its use
of arbitration by changing the terms of the dispute-resolution clauses
in its contracts. He argues:
Consumers have no choice but to agree to arbitrate, while
businesses have the choice to leave out an arbitration provision
whenever they wish to pursue litigation. Through the
sophisticated use of mandatory arbitration provisions, the
business sector may engage in a form of selective creation of the
common law—selecting which disputes, if any, our courts will be
allowed to deal with. In other words, consumer arbitration may
stall the development of the common law, or even worse, it may
control common law development to accommodate the needs of
business.143

Alderman has it partly right. But a business does not need to
amend its standard form contracts to move cases into or out of
arbitration. Instead, the business can keep an arbitration clause in its
contracts but simply not invoke the clause when it wants to litigate
instead. Indeed, the CFPB Arbitration Study provides evidence
consistent with this possibility, as described in the previous Part.144
Moreover, Alderman’s argument overlooks that businesses do the
same thing without using arbitration clauses—by selectively settling
143. Alderman, supra note 2, at 13–14.
144. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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cases. Without arbitration clauses, according to Galanter, businesses
would settle cases they perceive likely to make unfavorable law and
litigate cases they perceive likely to make favorable law.145 With
arbitration clauses (under Alderman’s view146 and the model outlined
here), businesses arbitrate cases they perceive likely to make
unfavorable law and litigate cases they perceive likely to make favorable
law. Indeed, the Coase Theorem suggests that in a world of low
transaction costs, whether the contract includes an arbitration clause
(giving a repeat-player defendant the right to keep the case out of
court) or does not (giving a non-repeat-player plaintiff that right), the
development of precedent will be essentially the same.147
So what difference does the use of arbitration clauses make in this
model? While the assignment of property rights (in a low-transactioncost world) does not affect the distribution of resources, it does affect
the distribution of wealth.148 So while the production of court precedent
would remain (roughly) the same, the distribution of wealth between
the parties would not. Without arbitration clauses, to avoid the
unfavorable legal precedent, the repeat player would need to pay the
non-repeat player a premium to settle the dispute. But with an
arbitration clause, the repeat player would no longer need to pay a
settlement premium, it could simply invoke the arbitration clause
(which the non-repeat player already has agreed to) to get the case out
of court and avoid the unfavorable court precedent. Arbitration saves
the repeat player from having to pay a settlement premium to the nonrepeat player. 149
This model is a highly simplified one. Given that plaintiffs’ lawyers
can be repeat players, even if individual consumers or employees are

145. Galanter, supra note 21, at 101.
146. Alderman, supra note 2, at 10.
147. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 8 (1960)
(“[T]he ultimate result (which maximises the value of production) is
independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work
without cost.”).
148. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev.
1089, 1095 (1972) (“In a society which entitles Taney to make noise and
which forces Marshall to buy silence from Taney, Taney is wealthier and
Marshall poorer than each would be in a society which had the converse
set of entitlements.”).
149. Note that the point here is different from the point made by Deepak
Gupta and Lina Kahn, who characterize arbitration as a wealth
redistribution mechanism. Deepak Gupta & Lina Khan, Arbitration as
Wealth Transfer, 35 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 499, 503 (2017) (“By both
suppressing claims and yielding outcomes less favorable to workers and
consumers, arbitration most likely transfers wealth upwards.”).
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not,150 disputes between repeat players and non-repeat players may be
less common than sometimes supposed. Moreover, the model assumes
low transaction costs in settling the disputes, which, given bilateral
monopoly problems in settlement negotiations, might not be accurate.151
Finally, the role of class actions in resolving consumer and employment
disputes (or the lack thereof when arbitration clauses are used) further
complicates the relative incentives of repeat players and non-repeat
players. The point, however, is more general: that one should not simply
assume that increased use of arbitration clauses necessarily reduces the
production of court precedent—i.e., that the displacement hypothesis
is correct. More careful analysis is needed to predict what the effect
might actually be in a partial-arbitration market.

III. Rule Production in an Arbitration-Only Market
and the Positive Externalities Hypothesis
The previous Part examined the extent to which courts might
continue to produce rules in a partial-arbitration market. This Part
focuses instead on rule production in an arbitration-only market: a
market in which all relevant disputes are resolved in arbitration. By
definition, in an arbitration-only market, no disputes raising issues of
law in the relevant contracting market end up in court, and no new
court precedent on those issues is produced. This is the scenario that
many commentators assume or assert will result from the use of
arbitration clauses.152 This Part examines rule production in such a
market by considering the extent to which arbitral awards might
substitute for court precedent in producing legal rules.
Certainly, arbitral awards do not serve as binding precedent the
way court opinions can.153 But Mark Weidemaier and others have shown
150. E.g., Drahozal, supra note 61, at 751 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys may represent
numerous employees, franchisees, or consumers against corporate
defendants, effectively becoming repeat players.”); Samuel Estreicher,
Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 559, 566
(2001) (“[T]he emergence of an organized plaintiffs bar . . . should drive
down considerably any claimed systematic advantage for employers.”).
151. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 567 (6th ed. 2003);
see also Stephen J. Ware, The Centrist Case for Enforcing Adhesive
Arbitration Agreements, 23 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 29, 118 (2017) (“[I]n
any negotiation that does occur after a dispute arises, each party has an
incentive to drive a hard bargain because the parties are stuck with each
other in the bilateral-monopoly sense that their dispute is with each other
so they cannot ‘shop around’ to find someone else with whom they would
rather negotiate an agreement about this dispute.”).
152. See supra text accompanying note 123.
153. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment
Discrimination Law, 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 395, 437 (1999) (“Should
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that arbitral awards can and do serve as persuasive precedent—at least
when arbitrators issue reasoned awards that are publicly available.154
This result is unexpected given the standard view that arbitrators lack
the incentive to issue reasoned awards and make them public—i.e., the
positive externalities hypothesis. This Part revisits the positive
externalities hypothesis and argues that taking a broader view of the
arbitration process helps reconcile that hypothesis with the empirical
realities of arbitration today.
A. Rule Production as a Private Good

As described earlier,155 William Landes and Richard Posner contend
that arbitrators “may have little incentive to produce precedents.”156 In
essence, they argue that rule production results in positive
externalities—benefits conferred on nonparties to the agreement—so
that arbitrators have too little incentive to produce arbitral
precedents.157 This positive externalities hypothesis is widely
an arbitration result in a new interpretive rule, it applies only to the case
at hand. Even if other arbitrators know about a prior arbitral decision,
they have no obligation to follow it.”); Michael A. Scodro, Arbitrating
Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 Yale L.J.
1927, 1951 (1996) (“[W]ritten arbitral awards carry no binding legal
authority, and thus do not add to the stock of controlling legal
precedent.”).
154. See supra text accompanying note 23.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
156. Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 238. As a possible exception, they
suggest the following:
Yet, despite all this, private judges just might produce precedents.
We said earlier that competitive private judges would strive for a
reputation for competence and impartiality. One method of
obtaining such a reputation is to give reasons for a decision that
convince the disputants and the public that the judge is
competent and impartial. Competition could lead private judges
to issue formal or informal ‘opinions’ declaring their interpretation
of the law, and these opinions—though intended simply as
advertising—would function as precedents, as under a public
judicial system. But this scenario is no more than plausible. If
there were cheaper methods of advertising one’s impartiality as
an adjudicator than by writing opinions, those methods would be
chosen and precedents would not be produced.
Id. at 238–39 (footnote omitted).
157. Because “much of the social benefit of litigation, viewed as a rule-creating
activity, is received by people who may never be involved in any
litigation,” according to Landes and Posner, “[t]he existence of this
external benefit may justify externalizing some of the costs of litigation
by financing judges’ salaries out of general tax revenues and keeping
litigant fees low.” Id. at 241. Of course, whether those fees currently are
set at the level for the optimal production of precedent is a wholly separate
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accepted.158 But Landes and Posner’s theoretical account is incomplete.
It both understates the incentives for private production of precedent
and overlooks the role of arbitral institutions—third parties that
promulgate arbitral rules and administer arbitration proceedings—in
promoting and publicizing arbitral precedent.
The description by Landes and Posner of the positive externalities
hypothesis elides two important sets of players in the arbitration
process. The first is the parties to the arbitration agreement.159 The
parties are the ones with the dispute, and the parties are the ones who
select the arbitrator (or at least the process for selecting the arbitrator).
As such, a more precise statement of the incentives of arbitrators is
that the arbitrators have an incentive to provide the services sought by
the disputing parties. Or perhaps even more precisely, the arbitrators
have the incentive to do what is likely to get them selected in future
cases, which typically translates into doing what the parties to the
present dispute want them to do.160 So if the parties pay the arbitrators
to resolve their dispute using certain procedures—such as by preparing
a reasoned award—that is what the arbitrators have the incentive to
do.
Of course, eliding the role of the parties in the arbitration process
might only be a simplification that does not change the result. Rather
than asking, as Landes and Posner do, “why should [the arbitrators]
make any effort to explain the result in a way that would provide
guidance for future parties?,”161 one could instead ask “why should the
parties pay the arbitrators to make any effort to explain the result in a
way that would provide guidance for future parties?” It might be that
the answer to these two questions is the same. Parties, like the
arbitrators themselves, might have no incentive to take (or to pay
others to take) actions that benefit future parties. On this view, the
positive externality is still present and arbitral precedent will still be
underproduced.

question. See Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good?
“Overcrowded Courts” and the Private Sector Alternative of Arbitration,
14 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 899, 911 (2013) (“Too large a subsidy
can overproduce a public good, and that includes the public good of law
and precedent.”).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 8–12.
159. Emmanuel Gaillard, Sociology of International Arbitration, 31 Arb. Int’l
1, 4 (2015) (describing the parties as “essential actors,” “without which
international arbitration would not exist”).
160. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges,
41 Pub. Choice 107, 107 (1983); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective, 24 L. & Soc’y Rev. 533, 545
(1990).
161. Landes & Posner, supra note 8, at 238.

128

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Arbitration and Rule Production

But even if parties do not have an incentive to pay arbitrators to
produce awards that benefit future parties, they do have an incentive
to pay arbitrators to produce awards that benefit the disputing parties
themselves.162 And reasoned awards might benefit the parties
themselves. If the private benefits from reasoned awards are large
enough, the disputing parties might nonetheless demand reasoned
awards even though those awards benefit others as well.163
Stacie Strong has identified four (what she calls “non-structural”
and what I would call “private”) benefits that reasoned awards provide
to disputing parties:
• “reasoned awards provide key assurances regarding the nature
and quality of justice that is being dispensed by the arbitrator;”
• “use of reasoned awards improves the quality of the decisionmaking process and consequently of the decision itself;”164
• “reasoned awards provide parties with a more comprehensive
and satisfactory explanation of why the arbitrator decided as
he or she did and may therefore increase the likelihood of
voluntary compliance, since the losing party will feel fully
‘heard’;” 165 and
• “reasoned awards enhance the legitimacy of the arbitral process
in the eyes of the arbitrators, the parties and the public,
including national courts that may be asked to enforce an
award, even if there is no ability to review the merits of the
award, by demonstrating the seriousness and integrity of the
arbitral endeavor.”166
162. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 160, at 545.
163. E.g., Thomas A. Lambert, How To Regulate: A Guide for
Policymakers 71 (2017) (explaining that a “common situation[] in which
private actors . . . create public goods” is “when some individuals have
personal preferences (i.e., high enough reservation prices for the amenity
at issue) that justify their bearing all the cost of the amenity, despite the
spillover of benefits onto others”).
164. S.I. Strong, Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration,
Kluwer Arb. Blog (Feb. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Strong, Kluwer
Arbitration Blog], http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/02/19/
reasoned-awards-in-international-commercial-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/
67UG-3AHX]; see also Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (and
Do They Matter?), 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1421, 1447–48 (1995) (“Reasoning
that seemed sound when ‘in the head’ may seem half-baked when written
down, especially since the written form of an argument encourages some
degree of critical detachment in the writer, who in reading what he has
written will be wondering how an audience would react.”), quoted in S.I.
Strong, Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration:
Embracing and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy, 37
Mich. J. Int’l L. 1, 20 (2015) [hereinafter Strong, Reasoned Awards Article].
165. Strong, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, supra note 164.
166. Id. For a more detailed description of each of these considerations, see
Strong, Reasoned Awards Article, supra note 164, at 19–20.
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Professor Strong concludes that these benefits “provide some
explanation of why parties continue to require reasoned awards even
though many jurisdictions do not incorporate a legal requirement for
such awards.”167
Focusing on the incentives of the parties instead of (or in addition
to) the incentives of the arbitrators thus directs attention to the
possibility that arbitrators will issue reasoned awards because the
parties demand it. The question remains, of course, whether party
demand will provide sufficient reasoned awards given that other parties
benefit as well. But that is a different question from the one answered
by Landes and Posner.
The second important player in the arbitration process (often,
anyway) that Landes and Posner omit is the arbitral institution—a
third party that promulgates rules, administers the arbitration
proceeding, and might appoint arbitrators, in exchange for a fee. The
substantial majority of arbitration agreements, from contracts governing consumer transactions to contracts governing sophisticated
international transactions, provide for an institution to administer the
parties’ arbitration.168
The incentives of arbitral institutions differ from the incentives of
the parties and the arbitrators. According to Mark Weidemaier,
“[a]rbitration providers [(another name for arbitral institutions)] sell a
diverse range of goods and services, including administration,
‘lawmaking,’ risk management, and legitimacy.”169 As Weidemaier
explains:
Administrative services include identifying and training
arbitrators, handling case logistics, and managing arbitration
facilities. Providers also sell private “lawmaking,” for example by
generating default disputing procedures and by providing an
institutional context in which private legal norms can develop.
And providers sell risk management, such as insulation from some
of the risk of class actions.
Most important for my purposes, providers may also sell
legitimacy. Arbitration clauses are often challenged by parties
who would prefer to litigate their disputes in court, and the

167. Strong, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, supra note 164.
168. CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 67, § 2.5.3, at 34; John F. Coyle
& Christopher R. Drahozal, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution
Clauses in International Supply Contracts, 52 Vand. J. Transnat’l L.
323, 355 (2019) (“Only nine (of 86, or 10.5 percent) of the arbitration
clauses provided for ad hoc arbitration.”).
169. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How
Contract Terms Do (and Do Not) Define the Process, 40 Creighton L.
Rev. 655, 661 (2007).
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designation of a recognized provider may help immunize the
arbitration agreement from challenge.170

To enhance the legitimacy of the arbitration process (and thus
increase the value of the legitimacy services they provide to parties),
arbitral institutions have an incentive to invest in their own
reputations, including their reputation for providing fair disputeresolution services.171 Likewise, the political realities faced by arbitral
institutions—the possibility of statutes or regulations restricting the
enforceability of certain arbitration agreements, for example—give
institutions the incentive to make arbitration (at least appear) fair to
all parties.172 One way institutions can advance both of these ends is by
requiring arbitrators to issue reasoned awards and to make (at least
redacted versions of) those awards public.
Finally, arbitral institutions have an additional incentive for
making arbitral awards publicly available: revenue from the sale of the
awards. Positive externalities from rule production, like other
externalities, create a profit opportunity. As Donald J. Boudreaux and
Roger Meiners explain:
Any failing market necessarily contains the opportunity for
profit; that is, the possibility of converting unexploited “social
gains” into exploited private gains. Whoever works successfully
to improve the allocation of resources (say an “entrepreneur”) can
profit from efforts: the person or persons who gain from the

170. Id.
171. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration, 79 Tenn. L. Rev. 289, 299 (2012) (“[O]ne reason
an arbitration provider might adopt a due process protocol would be to
protect its reputation as a provider of a fair dispute resolution process and
hence to enhance the enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards
in court. Indeed, the benefits of developing a reputation for fairness are
not limited to the provider’s credibility with courts, but could extend to
the provider’s acceptability to parties more generally.”).
172. Id. at 299 (“Arbitration providers might adopt a due process protocol to
reduce the risk of additional public regulation—that is, to reduce the
likelihood that Congress would regulate consumer arbitration more
stringently or preclude altogether the enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts.”); see also
Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, The Law Market 143 (2009)
(“These moves presumably represent a compromise between consumer
groups and companies brokered by the AAA to preserve consumer
arbitration against the risk that consumer groups will be able to persuade
legislators to enact more stringent protections at the state or federal
level.”).
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improved allocation will be willing to pay the entrepreneur for
the results of his effort.173

If the available profit is sufficiently high, and transaction costs sufficiently low, the entrepreneur can effectively internalize the externality.
Arbitral awards are valuable to non-parties to the arbitration.
Lawyers (and their clients) are willing to pay to obtain copies of awards
because they can serve as persuasive precedent in other arbitrations
and because the awards provide information about the decision making
of the arbitrators who issued them.174 The entrepreneur is the arbitral
institution (or, say, a legal publisher) that has access to arbitral awards
and can capture some of that value by selling access to the awards.175
As the next Subpart illustrates, arbitral institutions and legal publishers
have done exactly that in international commercial arbitration. These
incentives also explain, at least in part, why arbitral institutions have
adopted consumer and employment arbitration rules that require
173. Donald J. Boudreaux & Roger Meiners, Externality: Origins and
Classifications, 59 Nat. Res. J. 1, 21 (2019) (footnote omitted); see also
Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration, in V Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics 159, 172 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds.,
2000) (“But if external benefits are significant there are strong incentives
to internalize them, so when precedents become important institutional
adjustments are likely to be made.”).
174. See, e.g., Wolters Kluwer Partners with American Arbitration Association
to Enhance Labor and Employment Awards Database, Cision PR
Newswire (June 7, 2018, 01:52), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/wolters-kluwer-partners-with-american-arbitration-associationto-enhance-labor-and-employment-awards-database-300661896.html
[https://perma.cc/X79B-WL7L] (“This move is a direct response to our
customers, who have requested more awards for their research. The
addition of these highly valuable arbitration awards is Wolters Kluwer’s
latest step to further strengthen our investment in labor and employment
offerings that leverage high-quality content and cutting-edge technology.”
(quoting Chris Carr, Labor & Employment Law Portfolio Director for
Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S.)).
175. Unlike legal publishers, arbitral institutions face a countervailing party
demand (at least in some cases) for privacy of the dispute resolution
process. Some have suggested that parties value privacy less in dispute
resolution than is commonly supposed. Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie
E. Keer, International Private Commercial Arbitration: Expectations and
Perceptions of Attorneys and Business People; A Forced Rank Analysis,
30 Int’l Bus. Law. 203, 207 (2002), reprinted in Towards a Science
of International Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research
43, 52 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005)
(“Subsequent discussions with arbitrators in a round-table setting
revealed a view that privacy is an often overrated attribute. . . . This is
not to say that in certain specific cases privacy is not of primary
importance. But in overall rankings, privacy was next to last on the
scale.”). Regardless, arbitral institutions can balance the demand for
privacy against the demand for awards by publishing awards with partyidentifying information redacted.
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arbitrators to issue reasoned awards and that permit the publication of
awards (with the names of parties redacted). Recognizing the central
role of institutions in the arbitration process thus provides an essential
perspective for evaluating the positive externalities hypothesis.
B. Arbitral Practice and Rule Production

The Landes and Posner account of the positive externalities
hypothesis may have been consistent with the practice in domestic
commercial arbitration in the United States when they were writing.176
But it is not consistent with usual practice today in international
arbitration, domestic U.S. consumer and employment arbitration, and,
to an increasing degree, in domestic U.S. commercial arbitration.
First, reasoned awards are standard practice in international
arbitration. International arbitration rules commonly require reasoned
awards as a default rule177 (although they typically do not permit
publishing even a redacted award if a party objects178). And the only
available empirical study finds no substantial evidence that parties
contract out of that default.179 The same study (of international supply
176. Mark Weidemaier describes these sorts of views using Ed Brunet’s phrase
“folklore arbitration”:
[T]he foregoing picture of arbitration is quite stylized. It proffers
a vision of “folklore arbitration” that primarily reflects
assumptions about domestic arbitration practices within the
United States. Even within that sphere, it corresponds imperfectly
to a market reality in which arbitrators and arbitral institutions
offer a diverse range of arbitration products.
Weidemaier, Precedent in Arbitration, supra note 23, at 1905 (footnote
omitted) (citing Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a
Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 39, 42–45 (1999)).
177. S.I. Strong, Writing Reasoned Decisions and Opinions: A Guide for
Novice, Experienced, and Foreign Judges, 2015 J. Disp. Resol. 93, 98
n.32 (“Reasoned awards are nearly universal in international commercial
arbitration and investment arbitration.”); see, e.g., United Nations
Comm’n on Int’l Trade L., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art.
34(3), at 24 (2014) (“The arbitral tribunal shall state the reasons upon
which the award is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are
to be given.”); Int’l Ct. of Arb., Int’l Chamber of Com., Arbitration
Rules in force as from 1 January 2021, art. 32(2), at 38 (2020)
(“The [arbitral] award shall state the reasons upon which it is based.”).
178. E.g., Int’l Ctr. for Disp. Resol., International Dispute Resolution
Procedures (Including Mediation and Arbitration Rules) art.
40(4), at 36 (2021) (“The ICDR may also publish selected awards, orders,
decisions, and rulings that have been edited to conceal the names of the
parties and other identifying details unless a party has objected in writing
to publication within 6 months from the date of the award.”).
179. Coyle & Drahozal, supra note 168, at 370 (“All leading international
arbitration rules require the arbitrators’ award to be in writing and to
give reasons. Several clauses (11 of 86, or 12.8 percent) in the sample
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contracts) also finds that parties typically do not add confidentiality
provisions to their arbitration clauses.180 Moreover, a number of
international arbitral institutions have published redacted versions of
awards they have administered, and several legal publishers—including
Westlaw, Lexis, and Kluwer—provide electronic databases of international arbitral awards they have collected (from court filings and
other sources).181
Second, the same is true for consumer and employment arbitration
in the United States. The AAA and JAMS both require arbitrators in
consumer and employment arbitrations to issue awards that explain the
reasoning behind their decisions.182 The AAA consumer and employment rules also each authorize the AAA to publish redacted awards.183
As of June 1, 2021, over 3,500 AAA employment arbitral awards and
over 3,000 AAA consumer arbitral awards were available on Westlaw.184
reiterated those requirements, while another six (of 86, or 7.0 percent)
required the award to be in writing without mentioning reasons.”
(footnote omitted)).
180. Id. at 367–68 (“The default rule in American arbitration law is that
arbitration agreements do not impose an obligation of confidentiality on
the parties (as opposed to the arbitrators or the arbitration institution).
Only a minority of the arbitration clauses in the sample changed that
default rule: . . . just under 30 percent of the clauses required some degree
of confidentiality in the arbitration proceeding, meaning that, conversely,
just over 70 percent of the clauses did not address the issue.” (footnote
omitted)).
181. S.I. Strong, Past As Prologue: Arbitration As an Early Common Law
Court?, 57 Hous. L. Rev. 985, 1023–24 (2020) (“[T]ens of thousands of
arbitral awards have been published over the last few decades in specialty
reporters and electronic databases, thereby providing parties and
arbitrators with a rich source of materials to consider.”); Catherine A.
Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 1301, 1319 (2006) (“[I]nternational commercial arbitration
awards are being voluntarily published with greater frequency.”).
182. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Employment Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures 23 (2017) [hereinafter AAA Employment Rules]
(effective Nov. 1, 2009); Am. Arb. Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration
Rules R-43(b), at 27 (2016) [hereinafter AAA Consumer Rules]
(effective Sept. 1, 2014); JAMS, JAMS Employment Arbitration
Rules & Procedures 22–23 (2014) (effective July 1, 2014); JAMS,
Consumer Arbitration Minimum Standards: JAMS Policy on
Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses
Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness ¶ 10 (2009) (effective
July 15, 2009).
183. See AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 182, R-43(c), at 26; AAA
Employment Rules, supra note 182, Rule 39(b), at 23.
184. Sternlight, supra note 16, at 175 (“Currently, AAA employment awards
are available, for a fee, from LEXIS, Westlaw, BNA & Kluwer. However,
the fact that these decisions are available may not be well known, and
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To be clear, an award with reasons is not the same as an award with
findings of fact and conclusions of law; a reasoned arbitral award might
not include the same detailed factual or legal analysis as a court
opinion.185 Scholars have only begun to study the AAA’s reasoned
consumer and employment awards. The few studies that exist suggest
that the awards are often highly fact-based, as are many court
opinions.186 The extent to which these awards can substitute for court
precedent in producing legal rules remains to be determined.187
Third, the practice of reasoned awards is growing in domestic
commercial arbitration in the United States as well. The rules of several
arbitral institutions provide for reasoned awards as the default.188
Although the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules do not so provide,189
other arbitration providers may not make their decisions publicly
available.” (footnote omitted)).
185. See Ava J. Borrasso, Seeing “Reason” in Arbitration Awards: Recent US
Appeals Court Rulings Provide Clarity, Disp. Resol. Mag., Summer
2017, at 30, 31 (“[T]he courts addressing the issue thus far have identified
an award as sufficiently reasoned when it falls between a plain statement
of result and detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.”).
186. E.g., Sternlight, supra note 16, at 182 (“Upon reviewing the twenty-two
AAA decisions made available on LEXIS as of June 2018, this author
generally found them to be well-written and several pages long. These
decisions tended to focus more on facts than law, which is not surprising
given that arbitration awards are equivalent to trial court decisions.”
(footnote omitted)). See generally Ronen Avraham & William H.J.
Hubbard, The Spectrum of Procedural Flexibility, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev.
883, 944 (2020) (“[M]ost cases simply do not generate important
precedents, clarify ambiguous parts of the law, or otherwise have any
chance of impacting future parties’ behavior. Most cases settle, and even
those that do not rarely involve a precedent-setting appellate opinion.”).
187. Cf. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite, supra note 23, at 1139 (“In the three
regimes that feature reasoned awards, arbitrators wrote reasonably
lengthy decisions that were substantially devoted to legal analysis and
that made ample use of precedent.”); Martin H. Malin & Jon M. Werner,
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett: Oppression or Opportunity for U.S.
Workers; Learning from Canada, 2017 U. Chi. Legal F. 347, 376 (2017)
(comparing labor arbitration awards in Ontario to decisions of the Human
Rights Tribunal of Ontario) (“Although relatively rare in either forum,
arbitrators are more likely to criticize or refuse to follow established
authority or to identify and reconcile established authorities. They are
also more likely to distinguish established authority, although that
appears to be due to the higher rate of public sector cases in arbitration.”).
188. See John Burritt McArthur, Parties Usually Benefit Most from Reasoned
Awards, Not Standard Awards, 38 Alts. to High cost Litig. 44, 45
(2020) (citing JAMS and CPR rules).
189. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures R-46(b), at 27 (2016) (effective Oct. 1, 2013) (“The
arbitrator need not render a reasoned award unless the parties request
such an award in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator or unless
the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is appropriate.”).
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the available data indicate that roughly half of AAA commercial awards
nonetheless are either reasoned awards or include more detailed findings
of fact and conclusions of law.190 Unlike consumer and employment
arbitration, there is as yet no mechanism for making (even redacted
versions of) these awards public, although the incentive to do so is still
there.
Overall, the realities of arbitral practice, particularly in international arbitration and consumer and employment arbitration, but
increasingly in commercial arbitration, are inconsistent with the
positive externalities hypothesis. Instead, they are more consistent with
the possibility that arbitral awards might in fact produce legal rules in
an arbitration-only market.

Conclusion
This Article has sought to provide the foundation for a more
systematic study of the relationship between arbitration and rule
production. It has examined critically both the displacement
hypothesis—the view that arbitration is likely to displace precedent
produced by courts—and the positive externalities hypothesis—the
view that arbitrators lack the incentive to issue rule-producing decisions
of their own. The main conclusion of the Article is that the analysis is
not as straightforward as many commentators have assumed—that it
raises difficult theoretical and empirical questions, including (1) how
often is arbitration likely to be used to resolve disputes? (2) are the
“haves” more likely to obtain favorable court precedent (or avoid
unfavorable precedent) by using arbitration clauses? and (3) to what
extent do the incentives of parties and arbitral institutions to seek
reasoned, published awards differ from those of arbitrators? For all
three questions, the traditional answer is incomplete or misguided in
important ways, as the Article explains.
Many other questions remain to be examined and are worthy of
future research. From a positive perspective, those questions include:
How are judges likely to respond if disputes are increasingly resolved in
arbitration rather than in court? Will they write more opinions in their
remaining cases? Or perhaps write fewer opinions and hold more jury
trials instead?191 How will parties respond if, in fact, courts produce less
190. McArthur, supra note 188, at 45 (“[I]n awards issued in 2016, 41% of AAA
commercial and construction awards were reasoned, and another 8% were
findings of fact and conclusions of law, while 51% were standard
awards.”).
191. See Christoph Engel & Keren Weinshall, Manna from Heaven for Judges:
Judges’ Reaction to a Quasi-Random Reduction in Caseload, 17 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 722, 724 (2020) (“Our indicators suggest that
judges in the treated courts invest the additional time in better resolving
their assigned cases. For example, they use more laborious means of
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precedent?192 Will disputes be more or less likely to arise? Will parties
be more or less likely to file suit when a dispute does arise? Will parties
be more or less likely to settle? Will government enforcement actions
become more common to replace private suits subject to arbitration?193
How does the effect of arbitration on class actions, as opposed to
individual actions, change any of this analysis?
And from a normative perspective, those questions include: Is there
currently too much law or too little law?194 Or stated otherwise, how
much law is enough? If the use of arbitration increases, should
governments increase the subsidy they provide to court systems? Or
should they instead provide subsidies to arbitration, perhaps making
arbitral awards more widely (and inexpensively) available? As an
institutional matter, do courts or legislatures produce better legal rules?
Do courts or arbitrators?195 And how do the answers to all those
evidence (are more likely to hear witnesses), are less likely to write summary
judgments, more likely to decide cases on the merits, and write more
elaborate opinions. These changes are largely to the benefit of plaintiffs
. . . .”); Lee, supra note 16, at 17 (“As the rate of such resolutions slowed,
judges would probably publish opinions that they otherwise would have
ordered withheld from publication. They might even hear claims generating
publishable opinions that they otherwise would not have heard.”).
192. See Lee, supra note 16, at 18 (“Moreover, any decline in the production
of precedent sufficient to cause an appreciable rise in uncertainty about
how courts would interpret the law would tend to be self-correcting. The
uncertainty would itself spawn additional litigation—in part, perhaps,
because parties would less frequently agree to arbitrate their disputes—
and more litigation would in turn cause a rise in the production of
precedent.” (footnote omitted)).
193. See Erbsen, supra note 127; see Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 282, 289 (2002) (holding
that “an agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate
employment-related disputes [does not bar] the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from pursuing victim-specific judicial
relief”).
194. See S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky Defaults,
Status Quo Bias, and the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived
Legitimacy of International Arbitration, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 533, 573
(2018) (“[T]hese elements suggest that linking the legitimacy of particular
proceedings to the ability to generate binding precedent not only misstates
various issues of substance, but also seeks to address a problem (i.e., a
shortage of judicial decisions) that does not in fact exist.”).
195. See Ware, supra note 157, at 911 (“[P]erhaps arbitrators tend to make
better decisions than courts so arbitrator precedents—some arbitrators do
cite each other’s precedents—tend to be better than court precedents and
the higher quality of arbitrator precedents more than makes up for the
higher quantity of court precedents.” (footnote omitted)); Weidemaier,
Judging-Lite, supra note 23, at 1100 n.33 (“[E]ven if widespread use of
arbitration erodes the supply of judicial precedent, this loss may be
partially or entirely offset by the value of having competing producers of
law.”).
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questions change when different substantive areas of law are
considered? This Article is only the beginning. Much more work
remains to be done to understand the relationship between arbitration
and rule production.
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Appendix
Cases addressing the formation of consumer contracts, decided with
published opinions by the U.S. courts of appeals and state supreme
courts, from 2015 to 2020.
Cases involving challenges to the enforceability of arbitration
clauses:
1. Bacon v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., 959 F.3d 590, 599–604 (3d
Cir. 2020).
2. Wilson v. Huuuge, Inc., 944 F.3d 1212, 1219–21 (9th Cir.
2019).
3. In re Holl, 925 F.3d 1076, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2019) (denying
mandamus).
4. Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 292–93 (2d Cir.
2019).
5. Dye v. Tamko Bldg. Prods., Inc., 908 F.3d 675, 686 (11th
Cir. 2018).
6. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. The Container Store, Inc., 904
F.3d 70, 84 (1st Cir. 2018).
7. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 63–64 (1st Cir.
2018).
8. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74–80 (2d Cir.
2017).
9. James v. Glob. TelLink Corp., 852 F.3d 262, 267–68 (3d
Cir. 2017).
10. Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279,
1286 (9th Cir. 2017).
11. Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 238 (2d Cir.
2016).
12. Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325,
1330–32 (11th Cir. 2016).
13. Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp., 817 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7th Cir.
2016).
14. Williams v. TAMKO Bldg. Prods., Inc., 451 P.3d 146, 151
(Okla. 2019).
15. Moore-Dennis v. Franklin, 201 So. 3d 1131, 1144 (Ala.
2016).
Cases involving challenges to the enforceability of other contract
provisions:
1. Miller v. Sunapee Difference, LLC, 918 F.3d 172, 177 (1st
Cir. 2019) (liability waiver).
2. Starkey v. G Adventures, Inc., 796 F.3d 193, 197–98 (2d
Cir. 2015) (forum-selection clause).
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